

Association of Researchers of the Russian Society of the 20th Century Series
"AIRO – scientific reports and discussions. Topics for the 21st century»

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EVE GREAT PATRIOTIC WARS: DISCUSSION ONGOING

In 1999 publication of the works of Russian authors in
the series "AIRO — scientific reports and discussions. Topics for the
21st century" supported by "Maison des Sciences de L'Homme" (Paris)

Moscow
"AIRO-XX" 1999

International Council of Publishing Programs AIRO-XX

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The report is published thanks to the support
"Maison des Sciences de L'Homme" (Paris)

Meltyukhov M.I. **The eve of the Great Patriotic War: the discussion continues.**
Series "AIRO – scientific reports and discussions. Themes for the 21st century". - M.:
AIRO-XX, 1999. - 68 p.

ISBN 5-88735-052-0

ISBN 5-88735-052-0

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A WAR THAT DID NOT HAPPEN. PLANS OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA IN 1940–1941

The great connoisseur of the human soul, Honore de Balzac, argued that “there are two stories: the official story, which is taught in school, and the secret story, in which the true causes of events are hidden.” This kind of axiom can be applied almost every period of human history, especially when it comes to the unfulfilled intentions of those in power. In an effort to recreate the historical process in full volume, historical science must also take into account these failed calculations and intentions. The Second World War is no exception, which was one of the most important events of the 20th century, which determined and still largely determines the development of world history. Despite a large number of studies events of 1939–1945, there are still many poorly studied topics and debatable issues. As a rule, in historiography World War II dominated by the concept of confrontation democracy and fascism, which was based on propaganda countries of the anti-fascist coalition during the war years and which was fixed in historical science immediately after it. However, as accumulation and generalization of an ever larger array of documentary material in historiography, there was a tendency to clarify this concept or even abandon it. However, official historiography turned out to be unprepared to accept this trend, and the so-called “revisionist” direction gradually formed, which, on the whole, tends to give less ideologized picture of the events of 1939–1945. For all the ambiguity of some of the works of the “revisionists”, one cannot but note that the rivalry between the two trends in historiography contributes to a more objective study of world history.

The above situation developed in Western historiography in the 50–70s, while in Russian historiography unofficial assessments began to be expressed openly only at the end of 80s. However, the sharp ideological struggle characteristic of

of that period, left a noticeable imprint on the development of the traditionally politicized domestic historical science. IN under these conditions, any new views became rather a fact political struggle than historiography. As a result, a significant part of the ideas formulated in the late 1980s was not less unsubstantiated than the "established" views they were intended to revise. History re-evaluation process

The USSR could not but touch upon the history of the Great Patriotic War, especially its beginning and prehistory. Of course, the main problem of the beginning of the war, the causes of the tragedy of 1941, turned out to be in the center of public attention, the solution of which will require the long-term efforts of several generations of researchers. However, the move the ongoing discussions showed that not all of their participants well acquainted with the factual side of the problems discussed, and the main thing is largely connected with the traditional ideological vision of these issues, which was imposed by the official ideology. Since there was practically no tradition of ideological independence in Soviet historiography, no

not to mention that many simply could not take too much unconventional judgments, these discussions rather quickly found themselves in a vicious circle of discussion of the issue of "Stalinist mistakes" and have largely lost their edge.

True, the discussions themselves contributed to the introduction to the scientific circulation of many previously unknown facts and documents, but, unfortunately, due attention was not always paid to generalization these materials. This process was mainly developed in studies of the foreign policy of the USSR in 1939–1941. on the basis of borrowing a number of concepts typical for Western historiography of this period. Although these studies have not generally used a significant array of sources not directly related to the foreign non-political activities of the USSR, their appearance was the first a step towards revising the official concept of the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Already in 1991, A.G. Dongarov expressed the assumption that "behind the events of the first plan in the autumn of 1939 - summer 1941, as if indicating active preparations for repulse possible German aggression, there were some secret goals and calculations of the Kremlin, in which the attack option Germany was simply not envisaged for the USSR" (1). Certain reassessment of the military-historical problems on the eve of the war was proposed in the works of B.N. Petrov and V.N. Kiselev (2), published in 1991–1992, which, however, did not receive a proper response in scientific circles.

Since 1993, the military-political problems of the eve of the Great Patriotic War were at the center of the debate caused by publication in Russia of books by V. Suvorov (3). Although these works are written in the genre of historical journalism and represent a kind of "layer cake", when the truth is mixed with half-truths and lie, they quite clearly outlined the circle of the least developed in the historiography of problems. Over the years, discussion around they split into several directions. Some authors simply reject Suvorov's version. Others reject it, citing a whole number of errors and inaccuracies of the author, which, however, have no fundamental significance. Third, considering controversial and weak provisions of these books, attract new documentary materials for the analysis of the author's version, which confirm the need further development of these topics (4). Oddly enough, in the course of the discussion, the desire of a number of foreign historians, rather those who are indirectly familiar with the issues under discussion and Soviet archival materials, to act as mentors of Russian historical science. Be that as it may, the discussion that

unfolded led to the discovery of new archival documents on the history of the USSR 1939–

1941, indicating that the Soviet leadership, of course, However, he had his own view of the political situation of that period and tried to use it in his own interests. Appeared materials and studies have shown that the traditional official version of the exclusively defensive intentions of the USSR becomes less and less justified. Naturally, a new round of discussion did not escape a certain politicization, which was primarily with Suvorov's support for the old version of the German propaganda about Germany's preventive war against the USSR and blaming the Soviet leadership for unleashing the Second world war. The inconsistency of these theses has already been repeatedly shown in the literature (5), but supporters of the traditional versions continue to refer to them, justifying the rejection of consideration of the option of Soviet offensive preparations. Moreover, according to tradition, in the unfolding controversy, use of non-scientific arguments. Instead of presenting a point of view on the issues under discussion, argued by previously unknown documents and thorough research, some defenders of the traditional version declare a current

discussion as a manifestation of an "anti-scientific tendency" and call for "not give opportunities" to opponents to publish their research (6). This confirms the opinion of T. Mann that "we are more often angry and we are indignant, opposing some idea, when we ourselves are not too

who are confident in their own position and are internally ready to accept opposite side." As a rule,

supporters of the traditional version prefer to debate precisely around the concept of V. Suvorov, which is rather strange, since, perhaps, none of the serious researchers support it in full. As a result, it creates

the impression that these problems can only be considered from the point of view of the author of *The Icebreaker* or from the point of view of the traditional version. However, this is not the case, and the documentary materials and studies of recent years that have become available make it possible to propose other conceptual approaches to the problem under discussion. However, the defenders of the official version do not stop at

outright falsification, just to avoid discussing problems

1941 on the basis of currently available Soviet documents and the latest Russian historiography. So, for example, received

leadership of the Association of World War II Historians, when

the report devoted to these problems discussed at the meeting

December 30, 1997, was stated at publication in such a way that everything that did not correspond to the views was removed from it

V. Suvorov. This, apparently, was supposed to give greater credibility to the refutations of the opponents (6a). The current

discussion turned out to be in a situation where the process of introducing new documents into scientific circulation is necessary.

complement them with a comprehensive understanding, which requires the formulation of new concepts of the participation of the Soviet Union in the events 1939–1941 This will allow, first of all, to draw some conclusions.

discussions and take another step towards a more objective

pictures of the history of our country during the Second World War. To

accomplish this task, it is necessary on a wide historical

background to analyze the foreign policy activities of the Soviet leadership in

the interwar twenty years and in 1939-1941, his views on the events of the

European war, military preparations

USSR and the content of Soviet propaganda. Only such a comprehensive

study will make it possible to show how justified the revision of the traditional version of Russian historiography is and to give

encourage further study of these issues. Since the appearance

such a study is a matter for the future, below will be summarized

the main provisions of the alternative concept of the eve of the Great

Patriotic War and considered in detail based on the documents available today,

one, but, in our opinion, the key

the question of Soviet military planning 1940–1941.

Considering the situation in the world in the 20-40s. within the historical riko-politological analysis of the development of systems of international

relations, it is impossible not to notice that during the years of revolution and civil war the Soviet Union lost the empire position in the international arena and territory in Eastern Europe. In terms of its influence in Europe, the country turned out to be thrown back 200 years into the past. It is no coincidence that the Soviet leadership adopted the concept of "world revolution", which combined a new ideology and traditional tasks of foreign policies to increase the country's influence in the world. Strategic the goal of the country's foreign policy was the global reorganization Versailles-Washington system of international relations, which made the main opponents of England, France and their alliance

nicknames.

In the 20s. The Soviet Union managed to achieve diplomatic recognition, but attempts to strengthen its position in Europe and Far East did not give noticeable results. In addition, the events of the late 1920s highlighted a number of internal problems of the USSR, which limited the country's foreign policy activity. That's why the period of the global economic crisis was successfully used Soviet leadership to start a radical economic modernization based on the latest technological advances West.

In the 30s. international situation has changed significantly in connection with the beginning of an open struggle for the revision of the Versailles-Washington system between the leading "capitalist" powers. Betting on the inevitability of the emergence of a new inter-imperialist conflict, the USSR sought to prevent consolidation of the rest of the great powers, rightly perceive May it as the main threat to their interests. The Soviet leadership skillfully used official diplomatic channels, the illegal possibilities of the Comintern, social propaganda, pacifist ideas, antifascism, assistance to some victims of the aggressors to create the image of the main fighter for peace and social progress. The struggle for "collective security" has become a foreign policy tactic for Moscow aimed at strengthening the weight of the USSR in international affairs and prevent the consolidation of the rest great powers without their participation. However, the events of 1938 clearly showed that the USSR was not only still far from becoming equal subject of European politics, but also continues viewed by the European great powers as an object of their politicians. Under these conditions, only a new aggravation of the crisis in Europe allowed the USSR to return to big politics as recognized great power.

During the political crisis of 1939 in Europe, two military-political blocs: Anglo-French and German-Italian, each of which was interested in an agreement with THE USSR. For its part, Moscow got the opportunity to choose with whom and under what conditions it would negotiate and used it to the maximum, balancing between various military and political blocks. International relations of spring-summer 1939 in Europe represented a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals. Events developed in parallel in several directions: there were secret and open Anglo-French Soviet, Anglo-German and Soviet-German negotiations; Anglo-French-Polish and German-Italian coalitions took shape. Moscow in its calculations proceeded from the fact that the outbreak of war in Europe, both with the participation of the USSR in one

of the opposing factions, and while maintaining their neutrality, opened up new prospects for strengthening the Soviet influence on the continent. An alliance with one of them would make Moscow an equal partner with all the ensuing consequences. And the preservation of neutrality by the Soviet Union in the conditions weakening of both belligerents allowed him to take a position a kind of arbiter on which the outcome of the war depends. Based such calculations were determined by the Soviet foreign policy well.

The course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations showed that Britain and France were not ready for equal partnership with the USSR. IN Under these conditions, Germany's proposals turned out to be more attractive, and on August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow, which became a significant success. Soviet diplomacy. The USSR managed to stay out of the European war, while gaining considerable freedom of hands in Eastern Europe, greater room for maneuver between warring factions in their own interests, and in doing so, topple blame for the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on London and Paris. In 1939, Europe was split into three military-political camps: Anglo-French, German-Italian and Soviet, each of which sought to achieve its own goals, which could not but lead to war. Under these conditions, the pact on non-aggression ensured not only the interests of the Soviet Union, but and the rear of Germany, facilitating her war in

Europe. The start of the European war allowed the USSR to start revisions of its western borders, imposed on it in 1920–1922. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army invaded Poland, which meant

the actual entry of the USSR into the Second World War as an independent military-political force, so far more loyal to Germany. The Soviet military-political penetration into the Baltic states went through two stages. On

the first of them mutual assistance treaties and Soviet military bases were imposed on these countries, and on the second, in the summer of 1940, the Baltic region was occupied and annexed by the USSR. Moscow's military diplomatic successes in establishing Soviet control over the sphere of interests in Eastern Europe were interrupted by Finland, which, at the cost of a war with the USSR in conditions

the threat of intervention by England and France managed to maintain independence, although it ceded some territories. In the second half of June 1940, the Bessarabian

problem. Thus, by the middle of 1940, the Soviet Union in as a result of the Polish, Finnish, Baltic and Bessarabian campaign was able to occupy and annex most of the territory of Eastern Europe, which was assigned to his sphere interests in accordance with the Soviet-German agreements of 1939. New tasks now appeared on the agenda. Soviet-German

relations in 1939–1941 developed pretty ambiguous. They also included military and economic cooperation, in which the parties firmly defended their interests, but still found a compromise. There have also been lengthy disputes over a whole range of problems. Of course, neither side forgot about the likelihood of a military clash between them and carefully monitored the actions of a partner-rival. The mutual suspicion of the parties clearly began to grow from the summer of 1940, when, after the defeat of France, Germany became the hegemon of Western Europe and liberated itself from the land front, although the continuation of the war with England was fettered by her naval and air forces.

In this situation, in November 1940, at the initiative of Germany Soviet-German negotiations began in Berlin, during which the parties tried to find out the immediate intentions of each other. The talks revealed the real knots of Soviet-German contradictions. The interests of both countries clashed most sharply in the Balkans, Finland and the Middle East. If in 1939 Berlin and

Moscow was able to harmonize its territorial aspirations and to autumn 1940 basically implement these agreements, then with the end of 1940, the expansionist aspirations of Germany and the Soviet Union came into conflict and to settle them on the basis of compromise failed, as demonstrated by the negotiations in

November 1940 Germany, having defeated France, considered itself the hegemon of Europe and was not going to make concessions. From my side,

The USSR, having annexed new territories very easily, considered Finland, the Balkans and the Black Sea straits to be the regions where it has predominant interests and also did not concede. Compromise was hampered by the fact that the parties no longer needed him, hoping to achieve their goals by military means. The war between Germany and the USSR was generated by the struggle for dominance in Europe, but it was accelerated by clashes of Soviet and German interests over specific political issues. From November 1940, Soviet-German relations entered a new phase - the phase of direct preparation for war.

Moscow and Berlin maintained normal relations, but were the growing diplomatic struggle, especially in the Balkans. The Soviet leadership, without bringing matters to an open conflict, firmly defended its interests in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The expansion of the war into the Balkan region, which took place in the spring of 1941, was generally in the hands of Moscow, since it confirmed the impossibility of a German-British compromise. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union could calmly and consistently prepare for war with Germany.

Since the spring of 1940, while still in narrow, but rather high-ranking Soviet audiences, they began to hear more and more loudly voices about the need to modernize military propaganda. Tone Stalin himself asked these statements. Speaking at a meeting of the commission of the Main Military Council on April 21, 1940, he proposed "Radically reshape our military ideology. We must educate their commanders in the spirit of active defense, which includes the offensive. These ideas must be popularized under the slogans of security, defense of our fatherland, our

boundaries" (7). Already on May 13, 1940, at a meeting on military ideology in Political Directorate of the Red Army, its chief is the army commissar of the 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis stated that "the Red Army, like any army, has instrument of war. All personnel of the Red Army must to be brought up in peacetime, proceeding from the general goals of preparing for war. Our war with the capitalist world will be a just, progressive war, the Red Army will act actively, achieving the defeat of the enemy, his victory (as in the text. - M.M.) and the transfer of hostilities to his territory ... We are talking about active action and victory of the proletariat and working people of the capitalist countries, about active action when our state, the Red Army, will act as the initiator of a just war. Similar Ideas said the commander of the Leningrad Military District, commander of the II rank K.A. Meretskov, who pointed out that "our army is preparing

Xia to attack and we need this attack for defense. This is absolutely correct ... We must provide our country not with defense, but with an offensive ... Our army exists to ensure our state, our country, but in order to ensure this, it is necessary to defeat, smash the enemy, and for this it is necessary to advance" (8). The Soviet leadership knew about the presence of a large grouping of the Wehrmacht near the western borders of the USSR, but did not fear an imminent German attack, believing that Germany, bound by the war with England, would continue its offensive in the Middle East or will try to land on the British Isles (9). The situation in Europe gave Moscow a unique chance to endure war on enemy territory and liberate the continent from "decaying capitalism" using the slogans of national and social liberation. It was these ideas that were contained in the directive

tive documents on the direction of propaganda in the country and missions, which began to be developed in May–June 1941 after Stalin's famous speech on May 5, 1941. Judging by the available documents, the Soviet leadership considered the creation of a military industrial complex capable of providing offensive the actions of the Red Army, and the outbreak of war between the other great powers, the most favorable conditions for "crushing capitalism" by military means. This situation gave the possibility, under the guise of slogans about the "peacefulness of the USSR", to start "exporting the revolution" to the countries of Europe, the first stage of which was the aggression of the Soviet Union against its Western neighbors and the annexation of territories in Eastern Europe in 1939–1940.

Therefore, in May 1941, the restructuring of military propaganda began with the task of "educating personnel in a militant and offensive spirit, in the spirit of the inevitability of a clash of the Soviet Union with the capitalist world and constant readiness to launch a crushing offensive. Accordingly, "all personal the composition of the Red Army must be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out offensive foreign policy, resolutely eliminating the hotbeds of war at their borders, expanding their territories" (10).

Introduced in recent years into scientific circulation, archival documents of the ideological and propaganda preparation of the USSR for war, testifying not at all to defensive intentions Soviet leadership, have not been refuted by supporters traditional version. But a new argument was found not to admit the obvious. So yes. Volkogonov and A.S. Orlov state that "no one is aware of any document, plan,

which would confirm Stalin's plan to attack against Germany at some point" (11). They are echoed V.E. Molodyakov, who admits that "there are many approved ideological documents", but believes that "still not a single officially approved plan (or at least a document related to it) providing for the beginning of

hostilities by the Soviet side against Germany or its allies" (12). Indeed, many

documents are still unknown, but not because they were searched for and not found, but because many important archive funds are closed to unbiased researchers. However, the well-known documents of Soviet military planning, which are indeed the main proof of the USSR's offensive intentions, cast doubt on the validity of the above statements. Yu.A. Gorkov completely

right, calling for a comprehensive study of these documents, which, as far as we know, has not yet been done. And therefore his statement that "all documents of the operational plan - from the General Staff to the armies inclusive - allow us to conclude that The Soviet Union was not preparing to attack Germany first" (13) seems premature.

SOVIET MILITARY PLANNING in 1940–1941

In the concrete military preparations of the USSR, a key place was occupied by the activity of the General Staff on military planning.

nii, which still contains, unfortunately, a significant amount of in the "white spots", which is associated with the preservation of secrecy relevant documents 1939–1941. Now domestic historiography has a fairly complete picture of the development of military planning documents at the strategic level, but their content, as well as their connection with planning at the level military districts are still poorly studied. Content Soviet military plans are traditionally set out in Russian literature according to an established scheme: plans were developed in response to the growth of the German threat and provided for repulsing an enemy attack, delivering retaliatory counterattacks and a general transition to offensive to defeat the enemy. In accordance with this idea, the covering armies were tasked with a task within 10–15 days to defend on the line of the state border, preventing the enemy from invading Soviet territory, and to prepare for going over to the offensive together with the armies of the second strategic echelon (14).

However, documentary materials made available in the early 1990s, and studies of recent years significantly correct such approaches. It became known that Soviet military planning of military operations against Germany began with October 1939 and continued until mid-June 1941 (15). Behind during this period, five versions of the operational plan were developed use of the Red Army in the war with Germany. This, of course, does not exclude the existence of other working options, which are still are not available to researchers, which makes it difficult to analyze the development of these

documents. However, it should not be forgotten that the published documents cops, although they played an important role in Soviet military planning

nii, but did not exhaust it. First, these documents had a number of applications of a graphic and textual nature, detailing their content. Secondly, there was also a note on the procedure for the strategic deployment of the armed forces (tasks fronts and fleets) with a map and a summary table of the distribution of military formations, aviation and units of the RGC by fronts and armies; strategic transportation plan for concentration armed forces in the theater of operations (TVD); plans for covering strategic deployment; rear arrangement plan and material support of the army in the field; plans for communications, military communications, air defense and other documents. A comprehensive study of all these materials, which together constituted Soviet operational plan, providing an organized deployment and entry into hostilities of the Red Army in accordance with the goals and objectives of the first strategic operations (16), still remains, unfortunately, unrealizable. For now we have to confine ourselves to the available texts four memorandums addressed to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, containing the main ideas of military plans (17). Immediate the development of these documents was carried out by the deputy chiefs Operational Major General management General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky (northern, northwestern, and western directions) and A.F. Anisov (southwestern and southern directions) (18).

Before proceeding to the analysis of these documents, it is necessary to at least briefly dwell on the chronology of the process of their development. A document tentatively titled "Considerations on the Fundamentals strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East for 1940–1941." began to develop after the establishment of the Soviet-German border in accordance with the agreement of September 28, 1939. This process gained particular intensity from the second half of March 1940 and at the end of July, drawing up this document has been completed. Regarding his fate, there are two versions in the literature that complement each other. Some authors believe that the change in the western borders of the USSR in August 1940 and the formation of new formations of the Red Army required a significant revision of the document. According to others, this plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, who did not approve of it because he believed that in he attaches excessive importance to the enemy grouping located north of Warsaw and in East Prussia, and insisted

on a more thorough study of the option when the main forces the enemy would deploy south of Warsaw (19). In

pursuance of the decision of the Main Military Council of August 16, 1940, a new version of the plan was prepared by September 18, which took into account the possibility of using the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation in the North-West or Southwest directions. It is these deployment options Soviet troops are referred to in historiography as "northern" and "southern", respectively. This kind of planning was a peculiar tradition of the Soviet General Staff, since in 1921–1939 The Western theater of operations was divided almost exactly in the middle by the basin of the Pripyat River. Since September 1939, this river has been completely flowing across the territory of the USSR, but out of habit, it was this line, extrapolated further to the west, that divided the theater of operations into two main directions. On October 5, 1940, this version of the plan was reported to Stalin and Molotov. During the discussion, the General Staff was instructed to finalize plan taking into account the deployment of an even stronger main grouping as part of the Southwestern Front. As a result, it was planned to increase the number of troops on the Southwestern Front by 31.25% for divisions, 300% for tank brigades and 59% for air regiments (20). October 14 finalized "southern" version of the plan was approved as the main one, but it was decided "to have developed" and "northern" option. Development of both variants on the ground were planned to be completed by May 1, 1941.

Thus, the Soviet armed forces received a valid document, on the basis of which more detailed military planning was carried out. Troop commanders, members of the Military Councils and chiefs of staff were summoned to the General Staff.

military districts to develop operational documents that immediately approved by the people's commissar of defense. In addition to this document, the plans for military operations were reported to the Soviet leadership. against Finland, Romania and Turkey, which, in the opinion of their developers, gave the entire operational plan the necessary completeness and flexibility, made it possible to act depending on specific military-political situation (21). However, the

development of military plans did not end there. The military leadership sought to comprehensively evaluate both options. actions of the Red Army included in the operational plan. For verification of the "northern" version of the operational plan for November 17-19 In 1940, the General Staff planned an operational-strategic

playing cards under the leadership of the people's commissar of defense on the topic "Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of SD", during which, along with the elaboration of the foundations of a modern operation, it was planned to "study the Baltic theater of military operations and East Prussia." Later, the term of the game was linked to the end of the December (1940) meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army, and during it was decided to work out both variants of the war plan. To work out the "northern" and "southern" options on January 2–6 and 8–11, respectively. In 1941, two operational-strategic games, the details of which are disclosed in the works of P.N. Bobylev. In the first game played out the offensive actions of the Red Army in the North-West direction (East Prussia), and in the second - in the South-West (Southern Poland, Hungary and Romania).

Although the assignments for the games noted that the "Western" attacked, "no tasks related to the actions of the "Eastern" to repel aggression were solved." The parties were informed that the "Western" ones were driven back to the border, and in the Southwestern direction even to the line of the Vistula and Danube rivers in the territory of Poland occupied by the Germans, and from these borders there were already a game. Based on this, P.N. Bobylev criticizes the opinion M.V. Zakharov that the games were held to "work out some issues related to the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war". However, as A.M. Vasilevsky, "in January 1941... the main points of the operational plan were tested in a strategic military game." Even more categorical commander 6th Army, General I.N. Muzychenko: "We lost the war plan in January at the General Staff. As we will see below, the Soviet General Staff did not plan any defensive operations, therefore the offensive operations of the Red Army that were being played out should were to become the content of the initial period of the war. During the game the offensive of the "Eastern" in the territory of East Prussia for sipped, and in the South-West they achieved significant success, which led to the abandonment of the "northern" option of the Red Army. Thus, the main direction of the Soviet offensive Southern Poland was identified (22).

Reworking operational plan documents based on experience the January games were headed by the new Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov. According to the "Plan for the development of operational plans", it was required to clarify the documents for the "southern" version by March 22, and for the "northern" version - by March 8, 1941. Unfortunately, it is not clear

but, was this task completed, for prepared for March 11

In 1941, a new version of the plan finally consolidated the rejection of the "northern" version and refocused the main efforts of the troops on Southwest direction (23). The fate

of this version of the plan is controversial in the literature. So, B.N. Petrov notes that on April 10, 1941, a directive was prepared for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of troops in the border districts, based on the ideas laid down by in the plan dated March 11 (24). Yu.A. Gorkov, on the other hand, points out that "according to this version of the plan, clarifying directives were prepared in western border districts and the People's Commissar of the Navy, but their addressees are not sent" (25). However, as A.M. Vasilevsky, in this case the above-mentioned practice of calling in Moscow commanders of troops and chiefs of staff of the districts, who received all the necessary instructions (26). Therefore the conclusion Yu.A. Gorkov that "the plan revised in March 1941 was not move has been made" (27), without analyzing the still secret documents of the military constituency planning seems premature.

Be that as it may, work on clarifying the operational plan continued, and by May 15, 1941, another one was developed option. Around this document in Russian historiography a discussion arose on the question of whether it was approved by the Soviet political leadership. documentary data that would give an unambiguous answer to this question, are not known, therefore the main arguments of the debating parties are based on indirect information. Some authors refer to the fact that this document lacks the signatures of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff (28). Indeed, the absence of military signatures it is difficult to explain the leaders, but Yu.A. Gorkov notes that "after 1938, all the operational plans developed by the General Staff did not have the signatures of the People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff (except for the September 1940 plan signed by Timoshenko and Meretsky)" (29). That is, the execution of the document dated May 15, 1941 is completely is nothing extraordinary. It can be assumed, that clarification of the strategic plan approved in October 1940 deployments were made in working order. Doubts that Stalin was familiar with this plan are probably based on the fact that it lacks any of its resolutions. But information reported by A.M. Vasilevsky about the order of consideration

similar documents by the Soviet leadership confirm that Stalin gave all instructions orally (30).

The main argument of supporters of the traditional version of defensive intentions of the USSR became materials of conversations G.K. Zhukov with some military historians in the 60s. By according to V.A. Anfilov, in 1965 Zhukov told him the following. "The idea to prevent a German attack came to us with Timoshenko in connection with Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, to the graduates of military academies, in which he spoke of the possibility act aggressively. This action, in a situation where the enemy was concentrating forces at our borders, convinced us of the need to develop a directive providing for a pre-emptive strike. The specific task was A.M. Vasilevsky. On May 15, he reported the draft directive to the Commissar And me. However, we did not sign this document, we decided to report it to Stalin beforehand. But he really boiled when he heard about a warning strike against German troops. "Are you crazy get off, do you want to provoke the Germans?" - angrily threw Stalin. We referred to the situation developing near the borders of the USSR, to the ideas contained in his speech on May 5... "So I said this to encourage those present to think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, as the newspapers trumpet the whole world," Stalin growled. Thus was buried our idea of warning strike..." (31)

In 1966, Zhukov told N.A. Svetlishin that "I handed over my memorandum Stalin through his personal secretary Poskrebyshhev. I still neither the further fate of this note nor the decision taken on it is known. Stalin's decision And the lesson taught me on this occasion will be remembered forever. The next day, N.A. Poskrebyshhev, who met me in Stalin's waiting room, reported his reaction to my note. He said that Stalin was very angry with my memorandum and instructed him to pass it on to me so that I would no longer write such notes "for the prosecutor" that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was more aware of the prospects for our relations with Germany than Chief of the General Staff that the Soviet Union still has enough time to prepare for a decisive battle with fascism. And the implementation of my proposals would only play into the hands of the enemies of the Soviet Union. power" (32).

It is hard not to notice the complete difference between the two versions, which is very strange: after all, their author, according to the publishers, was one and the same person involved in the events described. Svetlishin's version looks especially wrong. First of all, it is not clear why Zhukov is handing over a top secret, of special importance document not to Stalin himself, but to his secretary. Not only is this practice not supported by other materials, it was expressly prohibited by the "Instructions for the development, use, accounting and keeping top secret documents of particular importance in central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and at the headquarters of the military districts and armies", put into effect by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0023 of April 12, 1941. According to the instructions, "completely secret documents of particular importance are operational documents related to operational deployment plans troops of the Red Army", which is confirmed by the presence on the document dated May 15, 1941, classified as "top secret/special importance". The instructions clearly stated that "the transfer of documents to signature, report, etc. through third parties (secretaries, adjutants etc.) is prohibited. Documents must be handed over to the appropriate officials from hand to hand" (33). It is also not clear why Stalin could not personally tell Zhukov everything that he allegedly conveyed through Poskrebyshev, who informed the general about this in reception (!?) Stalin.

Anfilov's version is more plausible, but it also contains clearly falsified information. First, the idea of preventing a German attack arose long before May 1941 and formed the basis of Soviet military planning in 1940-1941. Although it is possible that it was Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941 that prompted the military to prepare a clarifying document. Secondly, Stalin's answer to this proposal looks completely out of place.

What is the "provocation" here? Thirdly, it is hardly worth reducing the meaning of Stalin's speech to refute the allegations of foreign press, which was clearly not read in the USSR. Now this speech has been published (34), and everyone can be convinced of the complete divergence of its content and cited version. The only thing that both agree on version, this is Stalin's refusal to approve this document. It seems that this was precisely the purpose of the stories of Zhukov, who was one of those who were interested in hiding the truth about the failed attack on Germany. In addition, Zhukov was not in that position to allow yourself to tell the truth.

Yu.A. Gorkov puts forward a slightly different version in support of the fact that "the Soviet Union was not preparing for aggression against Germany in 1941", referring to the "lack of decision at the beginning war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government ... Until now, documents confirming the existence of such a political decision has not been revealed" (35). Unfortunately, authors who love to talk about the "political decision" about the outbreak of war are in no hurry to determine exactly which document is a "political decision". Moreover, disagreements exist even with regard to the actions of the German leadership. Some authors believe that Hitler made a political decision about the beginning of the war with the USSR in June-July 1940, when he gave the order to the beginning of its planning, while others claim that in December 1940, when he signed Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa". However it is known that even the Wehrmacht order to attack the USSR dated June 10, 1941 suggested the possibility of its cancellation, and only on the afternoon of June 21 did the troops receive final confirmation of the planned operations (36). Or, for example, the actions of the Anglo-French leadership, which planned intervention in the Soviet-Finnish war and attacks on Baku and Batumi, but despite the significant preparation for the implementation of these plans, London and Paris never made a "political decision" to start implementing them (37). Thus, the only thing that can be considered a "political decision" to start a war is to order troops to invade. Naturally, until June 22, 1941, the Soviet military-political leadership did not and could not give the Red Army such an order, but so the whole discussion on this issue is groundless.

According to V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilova

and P.N. Bobylev (38), is the process of strategic concentration and deployment of the Red Army in accordance with this plan and its subsequent refinements, which unfolded in April–June 1941. This clearly speaks in favor of his assertion. True, the moment of his approval remains unknown. Yu.A. Gorkov, who was the first to publish this document in Russian scientific periodicals, also believes that the plan was approved "in the initial period war actions of Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front determined by the strategic concept of the operational plan developed in May 1941" (39). In another post, he

writes directly that this plan was approved on May 15, 1941 by "the political leadership of the state" (40). To discuss

the current situation and the tasks of the troops for the western border districts arising from this plan, on May 24

In 1941, Stalin and Molotov held a meeting in the Kremlin with the People's Commissar of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, his first deputy, the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, commanders of troops, members of military councils and commanders of the Baltic Air Force (PribOVO), Western (ZapOVO), Kyiv (KOVO) special, Leningrad (LVO) and Odessa (OdVO) districts. In June clarification this document continued. June 13 Deputy Chief

General Staff Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin prepared a certificate of deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in the Western theater of operations, which specified the composition of the troops and their distribution along the fronts. In the same time, the idea of creating another front, the Southern Front, was worked out, which was formed in accordance with the decision of the Politburo

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 21, 1941 (41).

Such is the generalized picture of the course of the Soviet strategic planning 1939–1941 Now you need to contact directly vein to the analysis of the content of available materials.

ASSESSMENT OF FORCES AND ACTIONS OF THE ENEMY

The first parts of the documents were devoted to the assessment of armed forces and possible actions of potential adversaries (42). As Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and Japan appeared as such, i.e. almost all the neighbors of the USSR. The developers of the documents assumed that against the western borders

The Soviet Union Germany, Finland, Hungary and Rumania will be able to deploy from 236 to 270 divisions, over 10,000 tanks and from 12,000 to 15,000 aircraft. In the document dated May 15, 1941, this part contains information only on Germany, which could deploy for war with the USSR up to 180 divisions. Probably a similar reduction due to the fact that this document contains a plan of military operations in mainly against Germany. For the preparation of this part of the documents, the estimates of the Intelligence Directorate were used.

of the General Staff, which were significantly overestimated, since in reality, by June 22, 1941, for the war with the USSR, fiefs are much smaller forces.

Outlining the "probable operational plans of the opponents", the drafters of the documents constantly emphasized that "documented

mental data about the operational plans of potential adversaries both in the West and in the East. The General Staff of the Red Does not have an army" (43). And then we are talking only about the most probable assumptions in this regard.

Germany's intentions were assessed in the July 1940 plan as follows. Deploying the main forces north of the mouth the river San, from East Prussia it will inflict "the main blow on Riga, on Kovno (Kaunas), Vilna (Vilnius) and further on Minsk". At the same time, in Belarus, strikes are being made on Baranovichi and Minsk, and also to Dubno and Brody with the aim of mastering Western Ukraine. According to this option, up to 130 divisions will be concentrated to deliver the main attack, and the remaining 50 will act on south. However, the opposite option was not excluded, when the main the strike will be made in the Ukraine, and auxiliary operations will be deployed to the north. In this case, the Wehrmacht will be deployed in reverse proportion. Offensive actions were supposed from the territory of Romania to Zhmerinka and from Finland to Karelian isthmus, and later to Kandalaksha and Petrozavodsk. Having outlined both options for German action, the authors of the document made the following conclusion: "The main most politically advantageous for Germany, and, consequently, the most probable is the 1st variant of its actions, i.e. with the deployment of the main forces German army north of the mouth of the San river" (44).

In the course of further processing of this part of the document into text only partial changes were made regarding the directions of development of German offensive operations and deployed forces. Much more important are changes in the assessment of the main options for the German armed forces. If in the plan of September 18, 1940 it remained unchanged, then in the plan of March 11 In 1941, it was believed that the main blow of the Wehrmacht would be inflicted on Ukraine, and in the north, auxiliary blows would be inflicted on Riga, Dvinsk (Daugavpils), Volkovysk and Baranovichi, however, the northern option was not completely excluded. The document dated May 15, 1941 already proceeds from the probability of only the southern direction of the main Wehrmacht strike (45).

Thus, the assessment of the enemy's intentions, with the exception of the possible direction of the main attack, did not undergo significant changes. At the same time, it should be noted that in the absence of specific data on actual plans Germany, such assessments proceeded only from the configuration of the Soviet

sco-german border. It is also not clear why the authors of the documents completely ruled out the option of inflicting the main blow of the Wehrmacht in Belarus, and on what basis they made the conclusion about northern or southern directions of the main enemy attacks. When analyzing these sections of documents, one constantly gets the feeling that their authors are engaged in simple fortune-telling. Moreover, A.M. Vasilevsky points to the developers' lack of "a direct answer to the main question - about the likelihood of an attack on us.

fascist Germany, not to mention the determination of at least the approximate timing of this attack" (46), which directly refutes the official version about the development of plans to repel German aggression.

SOVIET GROUP FOR THE WAR IN THE WEST

When planning the operational use of the Red Army, the authors of the documents carefully worked out the issues of its strategic deployment. Military planning documents make it possible to trace the dynamics of strengthening the Western theater of operations, which it was supposed to allocate the main forces of the Soviet troops. According to the July plan of 1940, 68.7% of the available forces of the ground forces were allocated for operations in the West; according to the September plan - 68.9%; the March plan of 1941 assumed the allocation of 83.5%, the May plan 85.1%, and the June documents 79.2% (47). Main grouping Soviet troops was to deploy in the strip from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The dynamics of changes in the distribution of forces in two strategic directions is presented in table 1, from which it can be seen that the main grouping was deployed in the South-Western direction.

Table 1

Options for the distribution of Soviet troops in areas (48)

Directions	July		September 1940 1940		May	June 1941
	"northern"	"southern" 1941				
Northwest Division (%)	106 (63.5)	101 (62.3)	68 (48)	76 (34.2)	76 (38.2)	
tank brigades (%)	7 (63.6)	7 (63.6)	6 (54.5)			
air regiments (%)	94 (61.8)	90 (60.8)	59 (40.1)	34 (27.2)	34 (28.6)	
southwestern						
divisions (%)	61 (36.5)	61 (37.6)	96 (52)	146 (65.8)	123 (61.8)	

tank brigades (%)	4 (36.4)	4 (36.4)	5 (45.5)	
air regiments (%)	58 (38.2)	58 (39.2)	91 (72.8)	85 (75.9)

In domestic literature, it has become a common place for the approval notion that this happened due to an incorrect definition of advice by the military-political leadership of the direction of the future main attack of the enemy. However, as rightly pointed out by M.A. Gareev, "the direction of the concentration of the main efforts of the Soviet command was chosen not in the interests of a strategic defensive operation (such an operation was simply not envisaged and was not planned - and this is the main mistake), but in relation to completely different ways of doing things." However, in the case of the Soviet offensive "the mentioned option of choosing the direction of concentrating the main efforts in the South-Western direction was quite justified and more profitable than in the western direction, "because" it lay on more advantageous terrain, cut off Germany from the main allies, oil, brought our troops to the flank and the rear of the enemy's main grouping", while "the main attack on the Western direction led to a head-on collision with the main forces of the German army, required a breakthrough of fortified areas on very difficult terrain" (49). "And completely different conditions, and consequently, considerations, could arise if the strategic plan provided for the conduct of defensive operations at the beginning of the war to repel aggression. In that case, of course, it was more profitable to have the main efforts in the band Western Front. But such a way of strategic actions then was not expected" (50).

TASKS OF THE RED ARMY IN THE WEST

What tasks were assigned to all these troops? According to a document dated July 1940, "the main task of our troops is to inflict defeat on the German forces concentrating in East Prussia and in the Warsaw area; auxiliary kick

inflict defeat on enemy groupings in the Ivangorod region (Demblin), Lublin, Grubeshov, Tomashov, Sandomierz". Accordingly, the troops of the North-Western Front (8th, 11th armies, 37 divisions and 2 brigades) the task was set - "to attack the enemy in concentration with the ultimate goal, together with the Western Front, to inflict defeat his grouping in East Prussia and take possession of the latter".

The Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th armies, 51 divisions and 4 brigades) was supposed to "strike north of the river. Bug, in the general direction on Allenstein, together with the armies of the North-Western Front inflict a decisive defeat on the German army concentrating in East Prussia, take possession of the latter and reach the lower reaches of the river. Wisla. At the same time, with a blow to the left flank army in the general direction of Ivangorod (Demblin), together with the armies of the Southwestern Front, defeat Ivangorod-Lublin grouping of the enemy and also reach R. Vistula".

Before the troops of the Southwestern Front (5th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th Army, Cavalry Mechanized Group, 57 divisions and 4 brigades) the task was "active defense in the Carpathians and along the border with Cover Western Ukraine and Bessarabia with Romania, at the same time, with a blow from the front Mosta-Veliky, Rava-Russka, Senyava in general in the direction of Lublin, together with the left-flank army of the Western Front, defeat the Ivangorod-Lublin grouping of the enemy, go out and gain a foothold in the middle reaches R. Vistula" (51).

According to the plan of September 18, 1940, "the main forces of the Red Army in the West, depending on the situation, may be deployed either south of Brest-Litovsk, in order to cut off Germany from the Balkan countries with a powerful blow in the direction of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslau (Brati Slav) (So in the text - *M.M.*) , deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in questions of their participation in the war; or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of inflicting the defeat of the main forces of the German army within the Eastern Prussia and take possession of the latter.

It should be noted that, outlining the two use cases Red Army, the authors of the document emphasize what exactly The "southern" option is the main one. The substantiation of this conclusion is also interesting: "The strike of our forces in the direction of Krakow, Bratislava, cutting off Germany from the Balkan countries, acquires exceptional political significance. Also, kick in this direction will pass through the territory of former Poland, which is still poorly prepared in defense terms. The general task of the Red

Army in the West was formulated as follows: "1. Active defense firmly cover our borders during the period of concentration of troops; 2. In interaction

Vii with the left-flank army of the Western Front, with the forces of the Southwestern Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy grouping and reach the river. Wisla. IN further strike in the general direction at Kielce, Krakow and go to the river Pilica and the upper course of the river. Oder; 3. During the operation, firmly cover the borders of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia; 4. Active actions of the North-Western and Western fronts to pin down most of the German forces north of Brest-Litovsk and in East Prussia, while firmly covering the Minsk and Pskov directions. The fronts also received

corresponding tasks. Northwest Western Front (8th, 11th armies, 23 divisions and 2 brigades) were tasks were set: "1. Defending the coast of the Baltic Sea, together with the Baltic Fleet, to prevent the landing of amphibious assault forces enemy; 2. Strongly cover the Minsk and Pskov directions and in no case prevent the Germans from invading our territory; 3. In order to reduce the front of the 11th Army and occupy its more advantageous starting position for an offensive during the period of concentration of troops in cooperation with the 3rd Army of the Western front, seize the area of Seina, Suwalki and go to the front of Shit Kemen, Filipovo, Rachki; 4. After concentrating troops with a strike in the general direction of Insterburg, Allenstein, together with the Western Front, to pin down the German forces in East Prussia.

The Western Front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th Armies, 42 divisions and 4 brigades) received the task of "strongly covering the Minsk direction, concentrating troops with a simultaneous attack with the Northwestern Front in the general direction of Allenstein, forge German forces concentrating in East Prussia. With the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the offensive, with a blow from the left flank army in the general direction to Ivangorod (Demblin), help the Southwestern Front to break the enemy's Lublin grouping and, further developing the operation on Radom, ensure the operations of the Southwestern Front from the north" .

Southwestern Front (5th, 19th, 6th, 12th, 18th, 9th and Konno Mechanized armies, 96 divisions and 5 brigades) received the task "firmly covering the borders of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, concentration of troops in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western front to inflict a decisive defeat on the Lublin-Sandomierz enemy grouping and go to the river. Wisla. In the future, strike in the direction of Kielce, Petrokov and Krakow, seize the district

onom Kielce, Petrokov and go to the river. Pilica and upstream R. Oder".

The main tasks of the "northern" deployment option Soviet troops were to be: "1. Strong cover for directions to Minsk and Pskov during the period of troop concentration. 2. Inflicting a decisive defeat on the main forces of the German army, concentrating in East Prussia, and the capture of the latter. 3. The assist kick from Lvov is not only solid cover Western Ukraine, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, but and defeat the enemy grouping in the Lublin, Grubeshov, Tomashev area. The drafters of the document emphasized that "The defeat of the Germans in East Prussia and the capture of the latter have exceptional economic and, above all, political significance for Germany, which will inevitably affect the entire future course of the struggle against Germany. However, there are concerns that fighting on this front can lead to protracted battles, will tie our main forces and will not give a reliable and quick effect, which in turn will make it inevitable and hasten the entry of the Balkan countries into the war against us." The main tasks of the fronts remained the same as in the previous version of the plan (52).

In the documents cited above, the troops of the Northern Front deployed against Finland were given limited missions to secure the defense of Leningrad, cover the Murmansk railroad, and maintain "complete dominance in the Gulf of Finland." The authors of the documents suggested that "the entry into the war of one Finland is unlikely, the most real case is the simultaneous participation in the war between Finland and Germany, "and believed that "our actions in the northwest should be reduced mainly to active defense of our borders". True, the tasks of the Northern and Red Banner Baltic (KBF) fleets testify that "active defense" was supposed to take place on the territory of Finland (53).

We have allowed ourselves such a lengthy quotation, since this material demonstrates the absence of any connection between the actions of the Red Army and the possible actions of the enemy, about which were mentioned above. It is clear from the document the actual scenario of the outbreak of war, which is the basis for planning: under the cover of the troops of the western military districts The Red Army is concentrating and deploying in the Western theater of operations, simultaneously conducting private offensive operations, the completion of the concentration serves as a signal for the transition to a general

offensive along the entire front from the Baltic to the Carpathians with the main attack on southern Poland. German troops, as in the first variant of the plan, are designated by the term "concentrating", and This means that the initiative to start the war will come entirely from the Soviet side, which is the first to begin and complete the deployment of troops in the theater of operations. This conclusion is confirmed by a direct indication in the document that in the case of concentration the main forces in the North-West direction "provided that the railways work in full accordance with the transportation plan, the 25th

day from the start of mobilization, i.e. 20th day from the beginning of the concentration of troops" (54). That is, the transition to the offensive is connected not with the situation at the front, but with the completion of the concentration of the Red Army.

The widespread belief that the USSR first waited for an enemy attack, and only then planned an offensive, not takes into account the fact that in this case the strategic initiative would actually be voluntarily given into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops would be placed in deliberately unfavorable conditions. Moreover, the very transition from defense to offensive, so simple in abstraction, is a very complex process that requires careful and comprehensive preparation, which should have begun with equipment of four defensive lines at a depth of 150 km. But nothing like this was done before the start of the war, and it is hardly worth to seriously defend the thesis that the Red Army could successfully defend on unprepared terrain, and even with a sudden enemy attack, which Soviet plans do not provided. After all, "repelling aggression was conceived by conducting strategic (frontline) offensive operations in the main directions" (55). In addition, it is not clear why it is necessary to plan offensive operations if the troops have to defend themselves from an attacking enemy. 'Cause no one knows how it's gonna turn out the situation at the front during a defensive operation, where our troops, what condition they will be in, etc. In addition, the expectation of an enemy attack will not allow timely mobilization, which, accordingly, will make it impossible to carry out

all these plans.

It should not be forgotten that when developing problems of initial period of the war, the attention of Soviet military science throughout throughout the interwar period "was focused on the beginning of the war to bring their main forces into battle before their

the enemy and under more favorable conditions, securely seize the strategic initiative. The solution to this problem could be provided by: the creation of strong armies in peacetime, which could form the core of the main forces; advance comprehensive preparation of infrastructure, especially railways and roads, allowing timely deployment of the main

forces; detailed development of a plan for mobilization, concentration and operational-strategic deployment; creation of appropriate bodies for managing these processes; formation and concentration in the border area of special mechanized and aviation formations, called up with the beginning of military actions to disrupt the mobilization and concentration of the enemy's main forces; theater engineering equipment; air defense system preparation territory of the country; organization of the cover of the State border for the unimpeded conduct of mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops; early, latent carrying out partial mobilization and concentration of troops" (56). As is known, these measures were consistently carried out in the prewar period, which once again refutes the version of the defender other intentions of the Soviet military-political leadership.

Since the documents were detailed precisely offensive operations of the Soviet troops, talk about retaliatory actions of the Red Army is not possible. The content of these documents once again shows that the actions of the troops for cover during the period of concentration and deployment are not necessarily associated with repelling an enemy attack, but are a kind of combat guard of the concentrating troops. In addition, it should not be forgotten that cover operations were undertaken by the Red Army in the autumn of 1939 when troops to attack Poland and Finland and in the summer of 1940 for actions against the Baltic countries and Romania.

After the final rejection of the "northern" option, since the "deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West from grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that fighting on this front can lead to protracted battles" (57), in plan dated March 11, 1941, the main attention was paid to further development of the "southern" option. This document noted that "The most advantageous is the deployment of our main forces to south of the river Pripyat in order to powerful blows to Lublin, Ra-

set yourself the first strategic goal at home and on Krakow: to defeat the main forces of the Germans and, in the first stage of the war, to cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, to deprive her of the most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war against us ... A further strategic goal for the main forces of the Red Army, depending on the situation, can be delivered - the development of the operation through Poznań to Berlin or action southwest on Prague and Vienna or strike north on Torun and Danzig in order to bypass East Prussia" (58).

Unfortunately, we do not have data on the tasks of the fronts according to this version of the plan, but the available material also shows the continuation of the development of offensive operations of the Soviet troops. The opinion expressed in the literature that "the plan of March 11 1941 is the most accurate final expression of generally accepted views and most accurately reflects the personal position Stalin", can be accepted only partially. Indeed, in this The document outlined the quintessence of the "generally accepted views" of the Soviet leadership on the beginning of the war, but it was not final, since the process of developing the Soviet operational plan continued. The version that "the document was based defensive strategy" (59) has no basis. Case in that it clearly stated: "The offensive to begin 12.6." (60). The exact date for the start of an offensive, as is well known, is determined by the side that plans to have the initiative to start hostilities. True, this deadline was not met, but his appearance in the document is very revealing, as well as the fact that this is the only Soviet military planning document that published in the latest documentary collection in extract (61). Clarification of the

tasks of the Soviet troops found its further development in a document dated May 15, 1941. In it, for the first time, open and the idea is clearly formulated that the Red Army should "prevent the enemy in deployment and attack the German army in the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of troops", which, as we saw above, was present in a hidden form in all previous versions of the plan. Naturally, the developers of this documents talk about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR only presumably (62).

The troops of the Red Army were given the task of striking at German army, for which it was necessary "to set the first strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops - the defeat of the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line and exit by the 30th day of the operation to the front of Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The subsequent strategic goal is to have an offensive from the Katowice region in the northern or northwest direction to defeat the large forces of the center and the northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia. The next task is to destroy German army east of the river. Vistula and in the direction of Krakow, go to the river. Narew, Vistula and take possession of the Katowice region, for what:

a) deliver the main blow by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from its southern alliances

nicknames;

b) auxiliary strike by the left wing of the Western Front inflict in the direction of Sedlec, Deblin, in order to tie down the Warsaw grouping and capture Warsaw, as well as to assist Southwestern Front in defeating the Lublin grouping of the enemy; c) to conduct

an active defense against Finland, Eastern Prussia, Hungary and Romania and be ready to strike against Romania under favorable conditions. Thus,

the Red Army will begin offensive operations from the front of Chizhov, Lutowski with the forces of 152 divisions against 100 German ones. In other sections of the state border, it is envisaged active defense.

The term "active defense" should not be misleading, since it meant the totality of defensive and offensive operations. Since the document repeatedly emphasizes that it is the Red Army that will be the initiator

hostilities, this term most likely hides private

offensive operations to pin down the enemy.

The fronts received the following tasks. The northern front (14th, 7th, 23rd armies, 21 divisions) was supposed to provide defense "G. Leningrad, the port of Murmansk, the Kirov railway and jointly with the Baltic Navy to ensure for us full dominance in the waters of the Gulf of Finland". Indeed, it remains unclear how

the ground forces could secure dominance in the bay without occupying the southern part of Finland. The

Northwestern Front (8th, 11th, 27th armies, 23 divisions) was supposed to "strongly cover the Riga and Vilna directions with a stubborn defense, preventing the enemy from invading from East Prussia; defense of the west coast and the Ezel Islands and

Dago to prevent enemy amphibious landings." True, as the authors of the latest military-historical work note, the troops of the North-Western Front and the two armies of the right wing of the Western Front "were instructed, under favorable conditions, to go on the offensive, capture the Suwalki area, strike at

Insterburg and Allenstein, thereby tying down the enemy's forces" in East Prussia (63). The

western front (3rd, 10th, 13th, 4th armies, 45 divisions) should have been "stubborn defense on the front of Druskeniki, Ostrolenka, firmly cover the Lida and Bialystok directions; with the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the offensive, a blow from the left wing of the front in the general direction of Warsaw and Sedlec, Radom, break up the Warsaw grouping and capture Warsaw, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front, break up the Lublin-Radom enemy grouping, go to the river. Vistula and moving parts

take control of the Radom.

The southwestern front (5th, 20th, 6th, 26th, 21st, 12th, 18th, 9th, armies, 122 divisions) had the immediate tasks "a) concentric to encircle and

destroy the main enemy grouping east of the river. Vistula in the area of Lublin; b) simultaneously with a blow from the front of Seniava, Przemyśl, Lutów, defeat the enemy forces in Krakow and Sandomierz-Kielce directions and capture the region of Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, meaning in the future to advance from this area in a northern or northwestern direction to defeat

large forces of the northern flank of the enemy front and the capture of the territory of former Poland and East Prussia; c) firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and be ready to deliver concentric strikes against Romania from the regions

Chernivtsi and Chisinau with the immediate goal of defeating the sowing. wing Romanian army and reach the line of the river. Moldova, Iasi" (64).

Thus, the achievement of the immediate strategic goals was planned to be ensured by offensive actions, primarily by the troops of the South-Western direction, in which more than half of all divisions intended for

action in the West. To ensure a strong initial

attack on the enemy, the main forces were planned to be deployed in armies of the first echelon, which included most of the mobile formations.

PLANS OF THE NAVY

The offensive nature of the tasks of the ground forces corresponded to the active tasks that were developed by the command of the Soviet Navy, as evidenced by the memos of the command of the KBF to People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov and to the Naval Headquarters. So, the chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral Yu.A. Panteleev in a note dated July 5, 1940, analyzing the current situation in the Baltic, noted that, despite hostile attitude towards the USSR of Finland and Sweden, "the only adversary ... in this situation can only be Germany, which uses Sweden to deploy operations and especially Finland to use its flanking and rear location in relation to our bases at the mouth of the Finnish bay." Likely German operations in the Baltic Sea actions against the Moonsund Islands, Hanko and other bases of the KBF, which was supposed to provide their defense from the sea, create an anti-submarine line at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and ensure their communications from Kronstadt to Tallinn. Together At the same time, it was proposed to carry out landing operations against Finland to capture the Aland Islands, Kotka, the Aspe skerries and the occupation of the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland. Against Sweden, it was proposed to carry out a landing on the island of Gotland, where create a submarine base and an air force fleet.

Active minelayings were proposed against Germany and the actions of submarines on its communications, landing and supporting the flank of the ground forces south of Liepaja and preparing the fleet for a naval battle with the German Navy, breaking through into the Gulf of Finland. Panteleev considered the priority operations of the fleet to be "the capture of the Aland Islands in all cases of the situation in the Baltic and immediately. Operations to lay minefields and to cover them at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the Irben Strait and at German bases. The offensive of our ground forces to the north from the Gange (Hanko) base and to the west from Vyborg. Deployment of submarines on the communications of the Germans in the Baltic (the German coast of Kiel-Memel). According to the author of the report, it was necessary "not slowly in the same year to receive the Aland Islands and possibility of real control over all Finnish bases in Gulf of Finland by any means - up to war, otherwise

that all these opportunities are used by the Germans and will create this for We are in great difficulty." In addition, it was necessary to strengthen ship composition of the fleet, its air force, anti-submarine defense, concentrate the required number of mines and change the structure theater control (65). Just

as radical was the memorandum of Rear Admiral N.N., commander of the KBF squadron. Nesvitsky on July 10

1940 to the Main Naval Staff, in which, based on the analysis unfavorable situation for the USSR in the Baltic, suggested "in order to ensure both the bases and the communications that feed them, ... to resolve the issue of the independent existence of Sweden and Finland in favor of the USSR and make the Baltic Sea an inland sea. To ensure their bases, it was proposed to create a number of mine positions at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland and in the Irbensky the Strait, prepare for the active use of the Air Force and submarines to ensure their communications. As offensive operations, the KBF was supposed to support the flanks of the ground forces on Hanko and the border with East Prussia, to capture amphibious operations Gotland and the Aland Islands, land landing on the Finnish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, "which will ensure the offensive of our forces on the Hanko Peninsula", in Kotka and in Helsinki, "providing an offensive from Vyborg." It was also proposed to carry out operations to disrupt communications and destroy the German fleet (66). Directives of the People's Commissar of the

Navy of February 26

1941, the following tasks were assigned to the fleets in the western the borders of the

USSR. The Northern Fleet was supposed to destroy the enemy fleet when it appears in the Barents and White Seas; jointly with the 14th army to defend the coast of the Sredny, Rybachy and Kola and prevent enemy landings; assist the 14th Army in the capture of Petsamo; prevent the passage of ships enemy in the White Sea, the coast of which should have been defended jointly with the Arkhangelsk military district; cruising submarine operations in enemy sea lanes the western coast of Norway and the Skagerrak.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was supposed to prevent German amphibious landings on the coasts of the Latvian and Estonian SSRs, on the islands of the Moonsund Archipelago; together with Red Army Air Force to defeat the German fleet at

his attempts to pass into the Gulf of Finland; prevent enemy ships from entering the Gulf of Riga; assist the ground forces in coast of the Gulf of Finland and on the Hanko Peninsula, providing their flanks, as well as in the case of a speech against the USSR Finland destroy the Finnish coastal defenses; destroy battle fleets Finland and Sweden during their speech against the USSR; to ensure the transfer of one rifle division in the very first days of the war from the northern coast of Estonia to the Hanko peninsula, as well as being ready for landing on the Aland Islands; interrupt maritime enemy communications in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia ve.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of ensuring dominance on the sea; active mine laying and submarine operations to prevent the passage of the fleets of the hostile coalition into Black Sea; to prevent the transport of troops and military equipment by sea by the enemy to the ports of Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey; Not allow enemy landings; prevent action enemy ships along the Soviet coast; in the event of Romania's entry into the war, destroy or capture its fleet and interrupt communications, block the coast of Romania, including the mouth Danube; be ready for the landing of tactical assault forces; assist the left flank of the Red Army in forcing the Danube River and with further advance along the coast of the Black Sea; provide air defense of the Main Base and the Kerch sector of the coastal defense. The Danube military flotilla of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to prevent the enemy from forcing the Danube from the mouth R. Prut to the mouth of the Kiliya girl; prevent the passage of the military and other vessels in the section of Reni - the mouth of the Kiliysk branch; render assistance to ground forces in repelling a possible strike enemy from the direction of Galati to Giurgiulesti. The

Pinsk military flotilla received the task of assisting troops of the Red Army on the rivers Western Bug, Vistula and Neman at conducting offensive operations; fire of ships, crossing and transportation of troops, landing of tactical assault forces, cover flanks of troops resting on the river; fight river forces and enemy crossings; ensure their water communications (67). By April 15, 1941, the fleets

developed operational plans and cover plans, which were approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy. In the second half of June 1941 at the Baltic Sea Shipping Company

Since the beginning of the 19th century, a Special Purpose Detachment was created consisting of 19 transports, 6 icebreakers, 5 boats, 5 tugboats and 10 other civilian ships, which was capable of lifting 14-15 thousand people, 300-350 vehicles and 3 thousand horses in one flight, then there is one division for transfers to Hanko. At the same time, general fleet exercises of the Black Sea Fleet took place in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, which were usually held at the end of summer or autumn. For their implementation, on June 10, 6 civilians were mobilized into the fleet.

courts. During the exercises, under the guise of anti-amphibious operations, the troops of the OdVO, as previously the troops of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian military districts, worked out the issues of landing. Developed on the eve of the war by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet "Temporary instruction on fire interaction between ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the ground forces of the Odessa military district", which was taken as base and other districts, did not provide for joint actions in repelling an amphibious landing. It was only during the course of the war that Directives on anti-amphibious operations were developed (68).

MOBILIZATION PLAN OF THE RED ARMY

Since the strategic deployment plan and the idea of the first strategic operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the Red Army, they were closely linked to the mobilization plan. From April 1940, the development of a new mobilization plan began, which was approved on February 12, 1941

government. Mobilization deployment of the Red Army according to the MP-41 plan (official name "Mobplan No. 23") should was to lead to the creation of a wartime army. In total, it was planned to deploy 8 front and 29 army directorates, 62 rifle directorates, 29 mechanized, 4 cavalry, 5 airborne and 8 air corps, 177 rifle, 19 mountain rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 61 tank, 31 motorized, 13 cavalry and 79 aviation divisions, 3 rifle, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and 72 artillery regiments of the RGK, as well as

the corresponding number of rear parts. After mobilization the number of armed forces of the USSR was to be 8.9 million people, the troops were to have 106.7 thousand guns and mortars, up to 37 thousand tanks, 22.2 thousand combat aircraft, 10.7 thousand armored vehicles, about 91 thousand tractors and 595 thousand cars. Most of these troops had already been formed or were completing their formation, since, according to the system adopted in the summer of 1939,

the topic of mobilization deployment, the number of units and formations was brought to the level of wartime, which simplified the process of mobilization, shortened its time and should have contributed to a higher degree of combat capability of the mobilized troops. The main "feature of military construction in these years consisted in the fact that there was a covert mobilization deployment of the armed forces" (69). Only in the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941, 18 army directorates, 16 rifle corps directorates, 29 mechanized corps directorates, 5 airborne corps directorates, 86 rifle, 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions, 2 rifle, 10 airborne divisions were formed. and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades.

According to the MP-41 plan, the mobilization of the Red Army it was supposed to be produced in batches within a month. IN depending on the situation, it was planned to mobilize hidden or open. The covert mobilization method was worked out in detail. It was planned to mobilize the troops of the covering armies in two echelons. The first echelon, which included 114 divisions, fortified areas on the new border, 85% of the air defense forces, airborne troops, over 75% of the air force and 34 artillery regiments of the RGK, should was to complete mobilization within 2-6 hours from the moment mobilization announcements. The shortening of the mobilization period was achieved by calling up personnel and vehicles from nearby areas. The remaining troops of the border districts completed mobilization on the 2nd-4th day of mobilization, using assigned staff from the entire territory of the districts and from the interior of the country. Other troops completed their mobilization on the 8th-15th day, and spare parts and stationary hospitals - on the 16th-30th day. The mobilization of the Air Force was completed on the 3rd-4th day, and combat units and rear services serving them were put on alert within 2-4 hours after the start of mobilization. The air defense troops were mobilized in two echelons. The first had a constant readiness up to 2 hours, and the second was deployed on the 1st-2nd day of mobilization. The deployment of newly formed units was envisaged complete on the 3-5th day. Thus, out of 303 divisions of the Red Armies 172 had terms of full readiness on the 2nd-4th day, 60 divisions - on the 4th-5th day, and the rest - on the 6th-10th day of mobilization. All other combat units, front-line rear and military training establishments were mobilized on the 8th-15th day. Full mobilization of the armed forces was envisaged for 15-30 days,

the main part of the troops deployed approximately on the 10th–15th day (70).

COVER PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION, CONCENTRATION AND DEPLOYMENTS OF THE RED ARMY

An important problem of the entry of the Red Army into the war was the question cover for the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops. IN During the interwar period, it was believed that cover should be carried out by invading enemy territory, which would completely exclude his active actions against concentrating and deployed troops of the Red Army. Initially, these tasks were to be carried out by invasion teams, but "experience

The strategic games and exercises of the 1930s showed that the invasion groups were not able to fulfill the tasks that were assigned to them at the first strategic stage of the struggle. They were weak in to their composition and aimed at actions in isolated areas, which could lead to their consistent defeat. Instead of groups, it was planned at first to create invading armies or shock armies, and then it was recognized that it was necessary to assign the tasks of the invasion armies to the entire first strategic echelon of the armed forces" (71). In this sense, the problem of special cover operations was touched upon at the December (1940) conference of the senior command staff in the speech of the Chief of Staff Baltic Special Military District Lieutenant General P.S. Klenova (72).

Unfortunately, documents on cover plans for the entire interwar period are not available for study due to their secrecy. Only in 1996 were cover plans partially published.

western border military districts, developed in May–June 1941. Directives served as the basis for their development. People's Commissar of Defense, who, as indicated in the literature, were sent to the ZapOVO, KOVO and LVO on May 5, to the OdVO on May 6, and in PribOVO - May 14, 1941 In the publication of 1996, for some reason, it is indicated that the directives were sent to the OdVO on May 6, to the LVO, PribOVO and ZapOVO - May 14, and in KOVO - May 15, 1941, although even their file numbers do not correspond to this statement. However, it should be noted that published documents on

LVO demand clarification of contradictions in the date of the directive of the People's Commissar defense. This is all the more curious since all researchers refer to the same archival documents (73). Anyway

Today it is known that the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense were sent to the ZapoVO and KOVO on May 5, to the OdVO on May 6, and to the LVO and

PriboVO on May 14, 1941 (74). In addition, it should be noted that this publication all its importance, has not escaped a certain tendentiousness. First of all, the authors pass these documents off as operational plans.

districts, although these are just "cover plans for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment". That is, these documents, although important, are only part of the operational plan (75). Therefore, contrary to the assertion of the authors of the publication, these documents

do not "allow to determine how the strategic plan of the war was realized, to clarify its nature at the initial stage." Conclusion

the authors of the publication that "an analysis of the directives of the General Staff, dated May 1941, on the whole shows that no offensive tasks were assigned to the troops of the western border military districts", is fair, but it should be taken into account that

these directives were about developing cover plans, not the first operations of the war. Therefore, they cannot have similar instructions. After all, as noted by V.B. Makovsky, "operational cover was an integral part of the strategic deployment of the armed forces" (76). Thus, the authors of the publication strive

give out one of the areas of preparation of the Red Army for the war for the only thing. So they shouldn't have used the title "The End of the Global Lie".

The authors of the publication themselves note that the published documents "sin with formalism, the lack of an accurate assessment of the enemy, the definition of the balance of forces and means. Variants and methods of combat actions were not developed" (77). Much more

the actions of the Air Force were planned in detail, which, according to directives of the people's commissar of defense, the tasks were set "active actions... gain air supremacy and powerful blows

on the main railway junctions, bridges, stages and groupings of troops to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops. Gain air supremacy from the first

days of the war was supposed to be "a sudden strike on enemy aircraft at its airfields and by inflicting maximum losses

in air battles. It is clear that the most effective way to defeat enemy aviation would be the first strike against its bases. Therefore, after the air forces of the districts "concentrate, and

the enemy airfield network will be opened, it is necessary to proceed

drink to the decisive destruction of enemy aircraft "and others objects in the 200-km border strip (78). The planned grouping of troops of the western border districts for cover included 15 armies, which included 107 divisions and 2 brigades, 51 divisions remained in the front reserve, and 8 divisions (79) were at the disposal of the High Command. As military historians note, "comparative analysis the latest pre-war plans with plans for the summer of 1940 shows that ... the line between military operations on cover and first operations" (80), since the combat strength of the covering armies almost completely corresponded to the plan for the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in the theater of operations. According to V.A. Anfilova, B.N. Petrova and V.A. Semidetko, planned the grouping of covering troops was more adapted to the offensive than to defense (81), which could not but affect in the case enemy attack, because, as rightly pointed out M.A. Gareev, "the disadvantageous position of the Soviet troops was exacerbated the fact that the troops of the border military districts had tasks not for defensive operations, but only to cover deployment troops" (82).

Putting these plans into action did not at all coincide with the attack enemy. So, they emphasize that "the first flight and border crossing by our units can be made only with permission of the High Command" (83). That is, the initiative this action will come from Moscow, while, as in the case of repelling an attack, this instruction becomes invalid, since the troops are simply obliged to repel it, regardless of the border line. In respect of cover of PribOVO, it was noted that "the purpose of intelligence is from the first day of the war to reveal the intentions of the enemy, his grouping and timing readiness to go on the offensive" (84). This once again confirms that the introduction of cover plans depended not on the actions of the enemy, but on the decision of the Soviet command. According to M.A. Gareeva, "on the eve of the war in some overlooked the most important fact that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, both politically and militarily, one cannot proceed only from one's own wishes and motives, without taking into account that the enemy will strive to do everything so when it is convenient and profitable for him" (85), and "the idea of indispensably transferring the war from its very beginning to the territory of enemy ... so captivated some of the leading military ra-

botniks that the possibility of conducting hostilities on their own territory was practically excluded. Of course it's negative. affected the preparation of not only defense, but also theaters in general military operations in the depths of their territory" (86).

This conclusion is supported by the published papers on cover plans that did not provide for serious opposition to the concentration of Soviet troops from the enemy. Thus, the full deployment of the troops of the border districts in the cover zones took, according to plans, up to 15 days, which, naturally, would have been extremely difficult when the enemy advances. Moreover, in the event of an enemy attack, the troops of the first echelon would not have time to take their lines of defense on the border. As rightly pointed out V.P. Krikunov, "a characteristic feature of the cover plans was that they proceeded from such a variant of the beginning of the war and the situation that had arisen, in which they would be able to advance to the border without interference from a potential enemy, occupy the designated cover zones, prepare to repel an attack, conduct mobilization ... A feature of all army cover plans was the absence in them of an assessment of the possible actions of the enemy, first of all, the option of a sudden transition to the offensive rising enemy forces... The essence of a tactical maneuver was to quickly assemble and reach the border... It was assumed that time would be given in the areas of concentration for the final preparation for battle" (87). If the

covering troops really were preparing to repel enemy attacks, then this would "mean," according to M.A. Gareeva, that the border military districts must have carefully developed plans for repelling an enemy invasion, that is, plans for defensive operations, since it is impossible to repulse the offensive of superior enemy forces but to do it in passing, just as an intermediate task. This requires the conduct of a series of long-term fierce defensive battles and operations. If there were such plans, then in accordance with them it would be completely different, namely, taking into account defensive tasks, groupings of forces and funds of these districts, management would be organized differently and the separation of material reserves and other mobilization resources would be carried out. Readiness to repel aggression required also, that not only plans of operations are developed, but also in these operations were prepared in full, including in the material

technically, so that they are mastered by commanders and staffs. It is clear that in the event of a sudden enemy attacks, there is no time left for additional preparation of such operations. But this was not done in the frontier military districts" (88). Since

defensive operations were not envisaged, the troops of the first echelon of the covering armies received excessively wide cover strips on the border. So, in PribOVO the division accounted for 33 km, in ZapOVO - 47 km, in KOVO - 50 km, in OdVO - 90 km. This was not envisaged by any norms, according to which the width of the division's defense front was to be 8–10 km. The lines of armies averaged 170–176 km instead of 80–100 km according to prewar views; the cover lines of rifle corps were just as extended (84–92 km instead of the authorized 20–25 km). As noted by V.B. Makovsky, "plans provided for a relatively uniform formation of troops cover... Such a formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy creates the conditions for their defeat in parts, as happened later" (89). Naturally, under these conditions, "the ability of the covering armies to provide troops from a possible surprise attack by the enemy in operational-strategic scale was doubtful, since how the solution of this problem should have been preceded by measures for the operational deployment of covering armies and the engineering equipment of defensive lines" (90). Of course, the creation of rear defensive lines envisaged by these plans, it would be impossible in the event of an enemy strike. Except In addition, if the Soviet troops were really preparing to conduct defensive operations, it is not clear what prevented the creation of these frontiers, for example, in the spring of 1941.

It should not be forgotten that the planning of Western operations border districts to cover mobilization, concentration and the deployment of troops took place in accordance with the plan of May 15, 1941. It clearly indicated the purpose of these measures, which were carried out "in order to protect ourselves from possible surprise attack of the enemy, cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and **prepare them for going on the offensive**" (highlighted by me - *M.M.*). Therefore, it was necessary, firstly, "to organize a strong defense and cover of the state border, using for this all the troops of the border districts and almost all aviation, appointing

prepared for deployment in the west", and secondly, "to develop a detailed plan for the country's air defense and lead to full readiness of air defense means. According to the May directives

People's Commissar of Defense "development of plans for the defense of the state border and air defense completely" ended by June 1, 1941, but later this period was pushed back, and the plans for covering the districts were submitted for approval to the General Staff on June 6—

19, 1941 (91). Since defensive operations were not planned, in directives and cover plans, the following instruction was given: "Under favorable conditions, all defending troops and reserves of the armies and the district should be ready, at the direction of the High Command, to inflicting swift blows to defeat enemy groupings, transferring military operations to its territory and capturing advantageous lines" (92). In this sense, the conclusion of the authors of the publication that these documents are "a logical continuation strategic plan of war", which, as was shown above, provided for active offensive operations of the Red Army, is correct.

MILITARY DISTRICT PLANS

Setting the troops of the border districts the task of delivering strikes on the enemy, the Soviet military leadership had to give order to prepare these operations. This is confirmed by the aforementioned directive of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff to the commander of the ZAPOVO dated April 10, 1941, according to which, in accordance with the strategic plan, the North-West the front was supposed to "cover the Riga and Kovno-Vilna directions with a stubborn defense." The Southwestern Front was tasked "by a strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, in cooperation with the left flank army of the Western Front, encircle and destroy the enemy grouping east of the river. Vistula", the boundary of which was supposed to be reached on the 10th day of

the offensive. The troops of the Western Front were to: "1. During the period of mobilization and concentration of troops - stubborn defense, relying on on fortified areas, firmly cover our borders and prevent the enemy from invading our territory. 2. With the transition of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the offensive with a blow from the left wing of the front to break the Lublin-Radom grouping of the enemy. The immediate task of the front is to capture the area of Sedlec, Lukov and capture river crossings Vistula; keep in mind in the future

actions on Radom with the aim of completely encircling the Lublin grouping of the enemy, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front. 3. To ensure the main attack of the front, launch an auxiliary attack in the direction of Warsaw, with the task of capturing Warsaw and take out the defense on the river Narew. 4. Stubborn defense of the armies of the right wing of the front on the section of the river. Neman, Shchuchin, Ostrolenka firmly cover the Lida and Volkovysk-Baranoviche directions.

The armies of the Western Front also received corresponding tasks. So, the 3rd Army was supposed to be "defense on the front of the river. Neman, Schuchin, Kolno firmly cover Grodno and directions to Lida and to Bialystok and Volkovysk". The 10th Army followed "strong defense front lawsuit. Kolno, Novogrudok to the river. Bug, cover Bialystok direction. With the advance of the left-flank armies of the front to R. Vistula, take out the defense of the left wing of the army on the river. Narew and secure its eastern shore behind itself. 13th Army received the task "simultaneously with the 4th army of the front, strike with forces of at least seven rifle divisions and two mechanized corps in the direction of Kossov, Volomin, with the goal - access to the river. Vistula secure from the north strike of the 4th army on Sedlec, Lublin; in the future - actions with north to strive to capture Warsaw, the actions of the mechanized corps, with exit to the river Vistula, move to the south to assist the 4th Army. IN in turn, the 4th Army was supposed to, "strike in the direction Drokhichin, Siedlce (Sedlec), Garvolin, force the river. Boog, smash the opposing enemy and the moving parts to seize - on 3rd day of the Sedlec operation and on the 5th day of the operation by crossings to R. Vistula, the main forces on the 8th day to reach the river. Vistula, ready to cross it. In the future, keep in mind actions on Radom.

At the same time, it should have, "considering the possibility of transition the enemy on the offensive until the end of our concentration, cover the border to organize at the front of all armies by type strong, gradually increasing as troops arrive, defense with full use of fortified areas and field fortifications, with their comprehensive development during the period of concentration. It is clear that the cover plan should have been put into action not as a result of the actions of the enemy, but by order from Moscow. Naturally, the directive stated that "the first flight and transition state border is allowed only with special permission High Command", and it was required to develop "a plan for the implementation of the first operation of the 13th and 4th armies and a defense plan for the 3rd and 10th

armies" (93). As A.M. Vasilevsky, "for several weeks before the attack on us by fascist Germany ... all the documentation on the district operational plans was handed over by the General Staff command and headquarters of the respective districts" (94). All this once again points to the inadmissibility of mixing cover plans with the operational plans of the border military districts, which are still secret. Only separate military

planning documents in the LVO and KOVO in 1940 are known today (95). September 18, 1940 General Staff prepared a plan for the war with Finland, which emphasized that "the General Staff of the Red Army does not have documentary data on the plan for the operational deployment of the Finnish army," but did not exclude the possibility of active actions on its part in the first days of the war in order to capture Vyborg and exit To Lake Ladoga. Although the concentration of 49 divisions and 3 tank brigades of the Red Army destined for the war with Finland required from 35 to 45 days, the document did not provide no countermeasures to possible enemy actions, except for a cover operation. And it's hard to imagine that Finland, fighting the USSR one on one, would decide to open hostilities. The general task of the Soviet troops was to: 1. firmly cover our borders during the period of concentration of troops; 2. "The blow of the main forces of the North-Western Front through Savonlin to San Michel (Mikkeli) and through Lappeenranta to Heinola, in bypassing the fortifications created in the Helsingfors direction, and with a simultaneous blow from Vyborg through Sippol to Gelsingfors (Helsinki) to invade central Finland, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army here and capture the central part of Finland. Combine this blow with a blow on Helsingfors from the side of the Hanko Peninsula and with the actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in Gulf of Finland; 3. Simultaneously with the main attack of the Northwestern Front, strike in the direction of Rovaniemi-Kemi and to Uleaborg, in order to cut off northern Finland by access to the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and interrupt direct links between central Finland and Sweden and Norway; 4. Active actions in the north in the very first days of the war to deprive Finland port of Petsamo and close the Norwegian border for it at the Petsamo, Nautsi site" (96).

On November 25, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff issued a directive to the command of the LVO on the "development of a plan" for the war

ny with Finland, according to which the LVO was transformed into the North-Western Front and the main tasks were "to defeat the armed forces of Finland, seize its territory ... and access to the Gulf of Bothnia on the 45th day of the operation, for which: 1. In period concentration of troops to firmly cover the Vyborg and Kexholm directions, under all circumstances to keep Vyborg behind themselves and prevent the enemy from reaching Lake Ladoga. 2. By concentration of troops to be ready on the 35th day of mobilization for special instructions to go on the general offensive, inflict the main strike in the general direction of Lappeenranta, Heinola, Hämenlinna and auxiliary strikes in the directions of Korniselka, Kuopio and Savonlinna, Mikkeli, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army in area of Mikkeli, Heinola, Hamina, on the 25th day of the operation, master Helsingfors and go to the front of Kuopio, Jyväskylä, Hämenlinna, Helsingfors. On the right, the Northern Front (Kandalaksha headquarters) on the 40th day of mobilization goes on the offensive and on the 30th day of the operation takes possession of the Kemi region. It is clear that the directive contained carefully planned offensive tasks for the troops of the front and demanded that by February 15, 1941, plans should be developed for "concentration and deployment of front troops", "cover", "implementation of the first operations" and other documents that together made up the plan "S.Z-20" (97).

At the end of 1940, the chief of staff of the KOVO prepared a plan of military operations for the troops of the district in accordance with the general strategic plan. Naturally, the immediate strategic task troops of the Southwestern Front was "a rout, in cooperation with 4- and the army of the Western Front, the armed forces of Germany in the areas Lublin, Tomaszow, Kielce, Radom and Rzeszow, Jaslo, Krakow and exit on the 30th day of the operation to the front of the river. Pilica, Petrokov, Oppeln, Neustadt, cutting off Germany from her southern allies. At the same time, firmly secure the state border with Hungary and Romania. The immediate task is in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front surround and destroy the enemy east of the river. Vistula and on the 10th day of the operation go to the river. Vistula and develop the offensive in the direction of Kielce, Petrokow and Krakow. Accordingly, Western the front had the task of "strike the left-flank 4th Army in the direction of Drohichyn, Sedlec, Demblin to assist the South-Western front in the defeat of the Lublin grouping of the enemy and on the 15th day of the operation go to the river. Wisla. In the future, advance on Radom" (98).

The operation of the Southwestern Front was divided into three stages. The first stage was "defense on a fortified line along the line state borders" with the task "to prevent the enemy from invading Soviet territory, and to destroy the intruder and ensure concentration and deployment of the armies of the front for the offensive", that is, a cover operation. The second stage was the offensive fulfillment of the immediate task of the front to a depth of 120–130 km. Moreover, it was envisaged "the start of the offensive in the morning of the 30th day mobilization", and not "30 days after the enemy attack", as Yu.A. Gorkov, who in one of his works quoted the above phrase (99). The third stage of the operation was

"completion of the immediate strategic task of the front" to a depth of up to 250 km, which took 20 days. In this case the main blow was delivered by the forces of the 6th, 12th, 26th and Konno mechanized armies in the direction of Katowice-Krakow district. The remaining armies of the front provided this offensive with front Warsaw-Lodz and along the borders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, where a new front was to be created. "In the defeat the main enemy forces east of the river. The Vistula front proceeds to pursue in the general direction of the main forces in the area of Katowice–Krakow. In the first echelon of the front, mobile units. Rifle formations, reinforced with tanks and artillery, in turn advance in second echelons, ready to repel counterattacks and break attempts at resistance. The plan outlined in detail the tasks of the armies of the front. So, the

5th Army was supposed to "force the river. Bug, defeat the opposing enemy and reach the front by the end of the 3rd day - Michels Dorf, st. Zavaduvka, st. Vojslovice, capture Lublin with moving parts. In the future, advancing in the general direction

through Lublin, on the 10th day go to the river. Vistula". 19th Army should "with the beginning of the offensive of the main forces of the front, strike in the direction of Tomaszow, Zamostye. Using the success of the 5th and 6th armies, the 12th the day of the operation go to the river. Vistula on the section of Solets, Zavikhost". The troops of the 6th Army were instructed to "break through with a blow to Tarnograd enemy front, let a cavalry-mechanized army. By the end of the 3rd day of the operation, capture the northern exits from the Tanev forests in the Bilgorai region and the Ezhev region. With mobile units, capture the crossing at Sandomierz, on the 10th day of the operation, reach the river. Vistula". The 26th Army should have "forced the river. San and, striking with both flanks in the general direction of Rzeszow,

by the end of the 3rd day of the operation, capture Rzeszow and the border of the river. Whislock, and to seize the crossings over the Vistula and Dunajec with mobile units. IN further, advancing through Radomysl, on the 10th day of the operation go to the front of Shchutsin, Opatovets, Tarnow". 12th Army should was to "provide the shock group of the front from the south from Hungary and Slovakia, for which, inflicting the main blow in the direction Krosno, Jaslo, defeat the opposing enemy and on the 3rd day go to the Krosno area, and on the 10th day of the operation go to the Tarnow, Grybow front. The 18th and 9th armies received the task of covering the border with Hungary and Romania and being ready to respond to Romania's entry into the war. In particular, the 9th Army was to "with an immediate strike through Tulcha on Medzhidiv and Constanta, occupy northern Dobruja and reach the border with Bulgaria, cutting off Romania from the sea" (100). As you can see, the available documents are somehow do not quite correspond to the version about the defensive preparations of the USSR.

DIRECTION OF THE COMBATING TRAINING OF THE RKKA

Lack of access to similar documents

1941, one should refer to the available materials that show the direction of the training of the Red Army troops. Studies by a number of authors and materials from the "Reports on the combat and political training of troops" of the districts for 1939–1940. testify that the troops as a whole represented their possible combat missions and forms of use in case of war. These documents show that the troops of the border districts worked out both front-line and army offensive operations, and the troops internal districts - only army operations. Training in defensive battles was carried out mainly at the level of corps, divisions and their units (101). For example, according to the

order of the commander of the KOVO

No. 07 of January 26, 1940 "The tasks of combat and political training for the winter period of 1940." troops at the level of corps and divisions they were supposed to work out offensive, oncoming and defensive (with subsequent transition to the offensive) battles. In the operational preparation of the army and district apparatus, the following measures were planned. February 9–12 was district operational game (army) with the involvement of the command and staffs of the 5th, 6th, 12th armies and the cavalry group, corps and the district apparatus. The game was played according to a special plan,

therefore its subject from the document is unknown. February 25–29 – KOVO intra-staff game on the topic “The work of the front management during the period of concentration and deployment of front troops”. Operational army game on the theme “Offensive operation of the army” should was carried out in the 5th and 12th armies on March 2-5, and on March 7-10 - in the 6th th army. On March 14–17, a game was planned in the Caucasus Group on the topic “The operation of the cavalry army in cooperation with infantry formations and aviation to disrupt the concentration and deployment enemy troops in the initial period of the war. March 21-22, inside the headquarters game of the headquarters of the KOVO on the topic “The work of the front management for the preparation of the organization and during the offensive operation of the front. On April 7–11, a district operational (front) game was planned with the involvement of command and staffs 5th, 6th, 12th armies and Cavalry groups, corps and district apparatus. At the headquarters of the armies, games were planned on the theme “Rear in an offensive operation” - in the 5th and 12th armies on May 3-6, in the 6th - on May 8-11, in Kavgroup - May 14-17 (102). On

May 23, 1940, the KOVO issued directive No. A-1/0067 on operational training for the summer period. The troops were offered “on field trips, staff exercises and exercises with troops and during the maneuvers, work out in detail the following questions:

a) in the front line - an offensive front-line operation with a breakthrough of a fortified zone and forcing large river barriers. Operation planning and support.

b) in the army level - an offensive operation of the army, as a rule, with a breakthrough of a long-term fortified zone, with the forcing of rivers and overcoming obstacles. c) in corps and divisions: 1)

control of meeting combat; 2)

an offensive battle with a breakthrough

of a long-term fortified zone - forcing a river and overcoming

barrier strips;

3) a defensive battle with the creation of fortifications, the construction of barrier lines, and with a subsequent transition to the offensive. In the 13th sk,

96th and 192nd rifle divisions, everything should be worked out in mountainous conditions. d) in cavalry

and tank troops: 1) oncoming combat against cavalry, tank troops and infantry (kk, kd, tbr, mmd, KMG);

2) actions on the flank in an offensive operation;

3) entry into the breakthrough and actions in the operational depth; 4) defense on a wide front with the creation of barriers and fortifications (kk, kd, mmd) and with the subsequent transition to offensive. e) in

204 vdb - parachute landing and landing

large airborne assault and operations in the operational depth of the counter for the purpose:

- 1) the capture of enemy airfields and the destruction of his aircraft tions;
- 2) disorganization of management, communications and rear and production sabotage;
- 3) encirclement and destruction of the enemy in cooperation with mobile troops and aviation; 4) capturing and holding bridges, crossings and important objects

comrade

When addressing these questions, pay special attention to control of troops in mobile forms of combat, planning, organization and interaction of military branches, ground troops with aviation, communication and interaction with neighbors. Teach and educate commanders and staffs to defeat against

nickname in parts, by encircling and destroying him ...

In every way to instill surprise, secrecy, initiative and resoluteness of actions and massing of forces and means (artillery, tanks, aviation and material resources) on the main direction" (103).

But how in September 1940 the beginning of the war was played out in 6th Army KOVO. The "Western", having transferred the army to a martial law, "preempt us in deployment, their offensive should be expected from the morning of September 12". The "Eastern" put into action a cover plan and, from the evening of September 10, carried out a "concentration and deployment, occupation of the starting position", since September 13 reconnaissance of the enemy cover zone by observation from the line borders. On the morning of September 14, the 6th Army goes on the offensive and to September 16-17 destroys parts of the enemy cover, creates conditions for entering the Cavalry Army into the breakthrough, in cooperation with her and the 5th (according to the game the 15th) army defeats Tomashevskaya grouping of the enemy and goes to the line Zamoshtye-Belgoraj-Rzeszow the San river. In the period of September 17-22, the troops develop success, destroy suitable enemy reserves and reach the Vistula River, "having a strong barrier on the river. San". After two days of training

troops must cross the Vistula, continuing the offensive to the west (104). As you can see, again no actions are being taken to repel the enemy offensive, which, according to the instructions for the game, can begin 2 days before the strike of the 6th Army, is not practiced. The command is pretty optimistically assessed the combat capability of its troops, which had to turn around in 3 days for an offensive and in 9 days crush the enemy grouping in 14-16 divisions and reach R. Wisla.

It is believed that, unlike the Wehrmacht, the Red Army did not practice operational plans during operational games. Unfortunately, most of the documents on the operational training of troops not available for research. The available materials show that the operational-strategic games of January 1941 were not a single episode. So, on January 25, 1941, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov approved the "Plan for holding meetings of the highest commanding staff in the districts and armies", according to which should have been carried out in the Western, Kiev, Baltic special, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Transcaucasian, Transbaikal, Moscow military districts and the Far Eastern Front district front-line game on the topic "Offensive operation front." During the gathering, it was planned to listen to two-hour reports on the topic "Modern front-line operation", "Artillery in a front-line operation", "Horse-Mechanized Army in front-line operation", "Air Force in front-line operation", a war game on cards was also planned for 5 days. In the Odessa,

Oryol, Volga, Ural, Siberian, North Caucasian, Central Asian, Moscow, Kharkov, Arkhangelsk, Transcaucasian, Leningrad military

districts and in the armies of the border districts it was planned to carry out fees for practicing an army offensive operation. During fees, a four-hour report was planned on the topic "Modern army offensive operation" and military card game in within 4 days. The command staff of the headquarters and departments of the districts and armies, corps, divisions of the land troops and air force, tank and motorized armored brigades, artillery regiments and commanders who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (105).

From March 13 to March 20, 1941, the General Staff held with the headquarters of the Leningrad, Ural and Oryol military districts field trips on the topic "Offensive operation in winter". According to the order of the commander of KOVO No. A / 009 of February 5, 1941

from the commanders of the 5th, 6th, 26th and 12th armies, the commanders of individual the corps needed to strengthen the operational training of the commanders of the staff, until July 1, 1941, to work out an offensive operation, until November 1 - a defensive one. Exercises in March-April rifle corps on the topic "Offensive operation". May 7-10 in Lvov, a front-line offensive game was planned under leadership of the commander of the KOVO. On May 12-17 and May 25-30, command and staff exercises of armies and corps were planned to develop offensive operation. In addition, a plan was approved for the preparation of army departments to manage an army defensive operation with a field defense device with a forefield and with the subsequent transition to the counteroffensive (106).

On December 7, 1940, the commander of the LVO issued an order to prepare for the training and methodological gathering of the highest command personnel in the period from January 13 to 18, 1941, during which it was required to work out exclusively offensive topics at the level of corps, divisions, tank brigades, units Air Force. In March 1941, in the Leningrad Military District, Army General K.A. Meretskov spent a multi-day operational game, which involved the command and headquarters of the district and armies. The current assertion is that was a defensive game, contradicts the above documents. In addition, the history of the district indicates that "field trips on the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula were instructive, during which the nature of the modern

offensive operation and combat in wooded and swampy terrain on the scale of the army, corps and division, interaction with the Navy was practiced. Lectures were systematically given to the leadership staff, taking into account the experience of military operations during the second world war. Their theme was this: the nature of modern offensive operation, interaction of military branches, actions large groupings of mechanized troops, organization and conduct of landing operations" (107). The mood of the commanders of the district is evidenced by the following fact from the memoirs of the former 1941 Chief of Staff of the 14th Army L.S. Skvirsky. At first 1941 he was summoned to Moscow to discuss the issue of participation USSR in the auction for the Finnish nickel mines south of Petsamo. Having learned the purpose of the challenge, the author could not resist the question: "Why buy if we will soon, at war with Germany and its potential ally Finland, already return the mines to ourselves?" (108).

In PribOVO in February 1941, in the 8th Army, a command-staff exercise was conducted on the topic "Defensive Operation of the Front with the subsequent transition to the offensive to destroy the enemy with equality in forces and means. In March, during the assembly of the command staff of the same army, "the issues of organizing a breakthrough for a fortified zone, introducing a mechanized corps". In April, a field trip took place on the theme of "offensive army operation." Shortly before the start of the war, at the headquarters exercises in the 8th Army, a "variant of a counterattack in the Tilsit direction" (109). According

to the order of the General Staff of September 21, 1940 No. op / 103070 ss for the period from October 10 to October 17 was planned front-line field trip to ZapOVO under the leadership of the people's commissar defense, which was later postponed to October 15-22 due to the fact that the inspector of the demonstration exercises S.K. Tymoshenko did not have time to arrive on time. Certainly However, the materials of this trip are classified. But in the history of the district it is said that in the course of the exercises on the maps and the terrain "we checked and the views developed by that time by Soviet military science on the nature of an offensive operation were clarified... headquarters, took

participation of the district administration (in the role of front-line administration), as well as command of all combined arms armies" (110).

According to the former chief of staff of the 4th Army L.M. Sandalova, "all pre-war exercises, according to their plans and fulfillment, they oriented the troops mainly to the implementation of a breakthrough of fortified positions. "Command-staff exercises and field trips during the entire winter period and spring of 1941 were carried out exclusively on offensive topics ... In March-April 1941, the headquarters of the 4th Army participated in the district operational map game in Minsk. A front-line offensive operation was being worked out from the territory of Western Belarus in the direction Bialystok, Warsaw. In May 1941, already in the troops of the 4th Army, the offensive operations of the 28th Rifle Corps of the Army were losing. together with the Pinsk military flotilla in the same direction. Participant of the March game, commander of the 3rd long-range bomber corps N.S. Skripko recalled that the corps was "assigned dropping the airborne corps in the interests of the front

offensive operation", which was supposed to be carried out by one flight. "According to the terms of the game, we did not decide the bombing missions, and the cover of the landing was provided by the seizure of dominance in the air" (111).

On July 17, 1941, in the context of the proceedings on the fact of the defeat of the troops of the Western Front at the beginning of the war, a member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO, Corps Commissar A. Fominykh, prepared a memorandum addressed to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissioner of the 1st rank L.Z. Mehlis, in which he aspired to whitewash the work of the District Military Council in the pre-war period by pointing out the mistakes made by the General Staff. However, the document allows you to get information about the direction of operational training on the eve of the war. Moreover, the author compares the preparation and the actual events that took place. As evidenced by A. Fominykh, "the tasks were always given to work out options for offensive operation with a clear discrepancy between real forces. But from somewhere additional forces appeared and, in my opinion, an artificial advantage was created in our favor. Now when analyzing events, it became clear that individual employees of the General Staff, knowing that in the first period of the war, superiority in real strength on the side of Germany, for some reason carried out and developed mainly offensive operations and only recently (at the end of May 1941) did they conduct one game on covering the border, whereas it was necessary for the first period of the war, taking into account the surprise of the attack, to develop defensive operations" (112). It is symptomatic that the author distinguishes between covering operations and defensive actions of troops.

M.V. Zakharov points out that at the staff exercises in the OdVO in 1941, the possibility of "conducting active operations on the Focsha-Bucharest direction" (113).

RED ARMY DEPLOYMENT

ON THE WESTERN BORDERS

The military planning documents cited above give a fairly complete picture of the development of the views of the Soviet Union. It guides on the way the Soviet Union entered the war with Germany; that the Soviet side was not going to give the enemy the initiative to start hostilities. In addition, we should not forget that all these plans did not remain on paper, as the process of preparing their implementation gradually gained momentum.

leniya. This can be especially clearly seen in the example of the document dated May 15, 1941, which the Red Army was to be guided by at the beginning of the war. After setting out the general tasks fronts, it says the following: "In order to ensure implementation of the above plan, it is necessary to carry out the following activities in advance, without which **it is impossible inflicting a sudden blow on the enemy** (emphasized by me - M.M.) both from the air and on the ground:

1. carry out covert mobilization of troops under the guise of stock training fees; 2.

under the guise of an exit to the camps, to carry out a covert concentration of troops closer to the western border, first of all, to concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the High

Command; 3. covertly concentrate aviation on field airfields from remote districts and now begin to deploy aviation rear;

4. gradually under the guise of training camps and rear exercises deploy the rear and the hospital base." The military leadership asked "to allow the consistent implementation of covert mobilization and covert concentration of all armies in the first place. reserve of the High Command and Aviation" (114).

All proposed measures were immediately implemented.

lie.

On point 1. On March 8, 1941, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was approved, according to which it was planned to secretly mobilize 903.8 thousand conscripts under the guise of "big training camps". The implementation of these measures in At the end of May - beginning of June 1941, 805.2 thousand people were called up (24% of assigned personnel according to the mobilization plan). This made it possible to reinforce 99 rifle divisions, mainly western border districts: 21 divisions were brought up to 14 thousand people; 72 divisions - up to 12 thousand people and 6 divisions - up to 11 thousand people with a wartime staff of 14,483 people. At the same time, units and formations of other military branches, and the troops received 26.620 horses (115).

According to paragraph 2. In the period from May 13 to May 22, 1941, a movement begins to the western border of the formations of four armies (16th, 19th th, 21st and 22nd) and is preparing to advance three more armies (20th, 24th and 28th), which were supposed to complete the concentration by July 10th. These armies, uniting 77 divisions, constituted the second strategic

Czech echelon. 12–16 June 1941 the General Staff ordered headquarters of the western districts to begin under the guise of exercises and changes deployment of summer camps covert advance of troops of the second echelon of covering armies and reserves of the western border military districts (total 114 divisions), which were supposed to occupy July 1 concentration areas 20–80 km from the border. This, by the way, refutes the widespread assertions that “all preparations for war in the localities were suppressed from above” (116).

Regarding point 3. Information about the concentration of aviation is very scarce. Nevertheless, it is known that on May 1, 1941, in the western military districts there were 57 fighter, 48 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 5 assault aviation regiments, in which there were 6,980 aircraft. By June 1, 2 more attack air regiments arrived and the number of aircraft increased to 7,009, and by June 22 Western districts had 64 fighter, 50 bomber, 7 reconnaissance and 9 attack air regiments, in which there were 7,133 aircraft. In addition, by June 22, 1941 on The Western theater of operations had four long-range bomber corps and one long-range bomber division, in which there were

1,339 aircraft. From April 10, 1941, by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee

The VKP(b) began the transition to a new system of aviation logistics, autonomous from the combat units of the Air Force. This system provided freedom of maneuver for combat units, freed them from redeployment its rear after itself, maintained a constant readiness for receiving aircraft and ensuring their combat activities. Transition to this system was to be completed by July 1, 1941 (117).

On point 4. Until June 22, no data was published on the deployment of rear and hospital units. On the eve of the war the rear units were kept on reduced staff and should were deployed: army - on the 5-7th day, front-line - on 15th day of mobilization. It is known that 41% of stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army was located in the western districts, many of them were located in the 200-kilometer border strip (118). On These warehouses have accumulated significant stocks. As indicated A.G. Khorkov, “district warehouses, having a design capacity of 91,205 wagons, were loaded with 93,415 wagons. In addition, in the districts 14,400 wagons of ammunition and 4,370 wagons of equipment and weapons were stored in the open air” (119). In June 1941, the General Staff proposed to transfer more than 100 thousand tons of fuel (120). All this, according to G.P. Pastukhovsky,

was preparation "to secure deep offensive operations" (121). As noted in the study of the state of the rear of the Red Army, "with a depth of front-line offensive operation of 250 km, an advance rate of 15 km per day and timely recovery railways had every opportunity to ensure the holding the first operation with stocks created back in peacetime in the rear of the army" (122). Of

course, the main process that makes it possible to speak of the completion of preparations for the implementation of the plan of May 15, 1941, is the strategic concentration and deployment of the Red Army. As you know, "the last six months before the start of the war were already directly connected with the covert strategic deployment of troops, which was supposed to constitute the final stage of preparation" for war (123). But it is from April 1941 that a full-scale process of focusing on the future of theater of operations begins. allocated for the war with Germany 247 divisions, comprising 81.5% of the available forces of the Red Army, which, after mobilization would have numbered over 6 million people, about 70 thousand guns and mortars, over 15 thousand tanks and up to 12 thousand aircraft. Strategic deployment was driven by "the desire to pre-empt one's adversaries in deploying armed forces to inflict the first strikes by larger forces and the capture of a strategic initiatives from the very beginning of hostilities" (124). It is clear that these measures were carried out in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy and an all-encompassing disinformation campaign against the German leadership, which, in particular, was inspired that the main the efforts of the Soviet troops in the event of war will be directed to East Prussia (125).

TIME TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE

Since the strategic concentration and deployment of troops is the final stage of preparation for war, of particular interest is the question of determining the possible date of the Soviet attack on Germany. In Russian historiography, this the topic began to be discussed with the publication of the infamous work of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker", which names the "exact" date for the planned Soviet attack on Germany - July 6 1941, in fact, nothing substantiated. Author's motivation comes down mainly to the fact that July 6, 1941 was a Sunday, while Stalin and Zhukov allegedly liked to attack on Sunday (126). But it can hardly be taken seriously. Doesn't reinforce

the author's assumptions and the cited quote from the book "Initial period of war", the meaning of which he distorted. This book says that "the German fascist command (and not the "German troops", as Suvorov's - *M.M.*) literally in the last two weeks before the war (that is, from June 8 to June 22, and not "for two weeks", as in "Ledo Kol" - *M.M.*), we managed to preempt our troops in completing the deployment and thereby create favorable conditions for the capture strategic initiative at the start of the war" (127). Moreover, this quote by Suvorov is given twice: once correctly, and the second - distorted (128).

As noted above, the attack on Germany was originally planned for June 12, 1941. However, as is known, this did not happen. Definitely answer the question about the reasons the transfer of this period due to the state of the source base is not possible. We can only make some assumptions about this. According to Molotov (129), the Soviet leadership was greatly impressed by the flight of the Deputy

A. Hitler on the Nazi party R. Hess to England May 10, 1941 Fearing a possible end to the Anglo-German war, in The Kremlin deemed it necessary to delay the attack on Germany. Only after receiving information about the failure of the Hess mission and making sure in the continuation of the Anglo-German hostilities in Crete and In the Middle East, in Moscow, apparently, they decided not to put off the implementation of their plans any longer. As already noted, on May 24, 1941, a completely

secret meeting of the military-political leadership, at which rum, probably, the issue of a new deadline for the completion of military preparations was resolved. Unfortunately, in such a serious matter, we forced to confine ourselves to this working hypothesis, which is still to be confirmed or refuted on the basis of attraction new, as yet unavailable documents. Was there

an exact date planned at all? Only a comprehensive study of documents reflecting both the process of military planning and the conduct of measures to prepare for an offensive will make it possible to give a definitive answer to this question. However,

The dates of these events known to historians do not exclude the fact that such a date was nevertheless determined. According to V.N. Kiseleva and V.D. Danilov, the offensive of the Red Army was possibly in July 1941 (130). Available documents reflecting the process of preparing the Red Army for war indicate that most of the measures to increase the combat readiness of Western troops

border districts was to be completed by July 1 1941. By this day it was planned to complete the formation of all units deployed in these districts; equip tank regiments mechanized corps, which lacked tanks, with anti-tank artillery; complete the transition to a new aviation organization rear, autonomous from combat units; concentrate district troops in border areas; camouflage airfields and military equipment.

At the same time, the concentration and deployment was completed second strategic echelon of the Red Army. So, the troops of the 21st armies completed their concentration by July 2, the 22nd army - by July 3, the 20th army - by July 5, the 19th army - by July 7, the 16th, 24th and 28th armies - by 10 July. Based on the fact that "the enemy preempted Soviet troops deployed for about 25 days", complete the concentration and deployment of the Red Army in the Western theater of operations was to be completed by July 15, 1941. July 5 was to complete the organization of false airfields in 500 km border strip. By July 15 it was planned complete the construction of air defense facilities in Kiev and the camouflage of warehouses, workshops and other military facilities in the border zone, as well as supply all available weapons to the built structures of fortified areas on the new border (131). Thus, as It follows from known materials that the Red Army should have completed preparations for the offensive no earlier than **July 15, 1941**. At the same time, clarifying the issue of the planned date of the Soviet attack on Germany requires further research involving new documentary material.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the documents available to historians Soviet military planning 1940–1941 allow us to take a critical look at the traditional official version of the defensive intentions of the Soviet leadership. These materials testify that the Soviet military-political leadership

engaged in the preparation of mainly offensive military operations against Germany and its allies. Within one and a half For years, the Soviet General Staff carefully and comprehensively developed plans for an attack on Germany. The Soviet military leadership did not have information about the real military plans of Germany, although the configuration of the Soviet-German border made it possible to make rather accurate assumptions regarding the directions of possible Wehrmacht strikes. However, as the documents cited above show, no measures were taken to repel these strikes, many of which were actually planned and carried out by the German command during the war, were not prepared. Now military historians are forced to admit that “measures to repel the first enemy strikes in the operational plans were developed by the General Staff insufficiently, and the content defensive actions on an operational-strategic scale was not worked out” (132). The absence of a connection between a possible enemy strike and the actions of the Red Army refutes the version about the supposedly retaliatory nature of the offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the development of which was devoted to military plans. The basic idea of Soviet military planning was that the Red Army, under cover of deployed border troops of the western border districts will complete the concentration of forces intended for the war on the theater of operations and will move into a sudden decisive offensive, inflicting the main blow on southern Poland. For six months, the Soviet General Staff was engaged in solution of the question of the most advantageous direction of concentration

niya of the main efforts of the troops in the war with Germany. The result was it was concluded that the offensive in the South-Western direction would solve several key strategic tasks and ensure the most effective actions of the Red Army. The first half of 1941 was devoted to the careful practice of this strike. Appropriate training was carried out at the level of military districts. As the above materials show, the troops purposefully worked out offensive plans, learned how to conduct

maneuver offensive. Unfortunately, operational district plans are still inaccessible to researchers, which does not allow recreating the operational plan in all details Soviet military leadership. It would be interesting to get acquainted, for example, with the addendum to the plan dated May 15, 1941, entitled "Plan of planned military operations in the event of a war with Germany", which is still secret.

The main attention of researchers was attracted by a document dated May 15, 1941, in which the Soviet offensive intent. Naturally, supporters of the official versions did everything to prove that this plan was not approved political leadership of the USSR, but was only a working document of the General Staff. However, this view has been refuted, and Now we should proceed from the fact that this particular document was the final operational plan of the Soviet General Staff, the Red Army was preparing for its implementation in May-June 1941, when preparations for a Soviet attack on Germany entered the final stage. Just like Germany, the Soviet side, based on the content of its plans, sought to achieve the immediate strategic goals of the war in a short time by an offensive strike groups deployed by a certain date. This and should have been the main content of the initial period war" (133).

The available material allows us to speculate about the sequence of the final preparations of the Soviet troops to war. Most likely, on July 1, 1941, the troops of the western districts would have received an order to put into action cover plans, and the completion by July 15 of the deployment of the planned Red Army grouping in the Western theater of operations would have allowed the USSR to after this date to start hostilities against Germany. The impossibility of completely keeping secret Soviet military preparations did not allow for a long time to postpone the strike on Germany,

otherwise the German side would have known about them. Therefore, the completion of the concentration and deployment of the Red Army on the western border of the USSR should have served as a signal for an immediate attack on Germany. Only in this case would it be possible to save these preparations in secret and take the enemy by surprise.

Of course, one should not consider the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the event of a sudden strike against Germany as "Walk to Berlin". Of course, it would be a difficult, bloody fight with a serious enemy, but the attack of the Red Army would lead to the disruption of the German invasion of the USSR and would facilitate the victory in the war, saving our country millions of lives and significant material values. The Red Army could be in Berlin no later than 1942, which would make it possible to put under the control of Moscow a much larger area in Europe, if it happened in 1945. Unfortunately, these intentions were not realized and this, probably, "is one of the main historical miscalculations of Stalin" (134). As a result, the German leadership was able to begin on June 22, 1941, the implementation of the plan "Barbarossa", which, in the conditions of the unpreparedness of the Red Army for defense, led to the tragedy of 1941.

In connection with the foregoing, the question arises whether there was whether the German attack on the USSR in this case was a preventive war, as German propaganda claimed. Because the preventive war is "military action taken to preempting the actions of the enemy, ready to attack or already who started it, by his own offensive", it is possible only if the party taking such actions knows about the enemy's intentions. Since neither Germany nor the USSR did not count on an enemy offensive in the summer of 1941, which means the thesis of "preventive" actions does not apply to any of them. IN In this case, the version of "preventive war" has nothing at all in common with historical science, but is purely propaganda thesis to justify German aggression. As a result of the fact that the parties in their calculations proceeded from different start dates of the war, the German command, due to a coincidence, preempted the Soviet troops in completing the deployment and thereby created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war.

Thus, both Germany and the USSR carefully prepared for war, and from the beginning of 1941 this process entered its final

stage that made the start of the Soviet-German war inevitable precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it. As is now known, both sides in their calculations proceeded from the fact that the war would start on their own initiative. The sudden attack of Germany on the USSR on June 22, 1941 and the first setbacks at the front stunning effect on the Soviet leadership. Most figuratively this situation was described in his memoirs by the then Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, noting that "the state machine, directed along the rails of the improbability of Hitler's attack, was forced to stop, go through a period of confusion and then rotate 180 degrees. The consequences of this had correct on the go at the cost of great sacrifices" (135).

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LR No. 030620 dated 11/11/1994

Signed for printing from the original layout 04/14/99

Format 60 x 80 1/16, office paper. Conv. oven l. 4.25.

Circulation 300 copies.

AIRO-XX

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